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 ABSTRACT 
 
In 1996, an estimated 400,000 people in a gold mining community in rural Tanzania were 
forcibly evicted from the area to allow for the development of a large-scale gold mine 
project to take place. The good-intentioned project was based on the idea of putting 
national development and public interest before the individual or community 
development and private interest. This thesis set out in 2006 to investigate how the 
livelihoods of the displaced community were affected by this development project. The 
main conclusion is that the displaced individuals had become poorer in 2006 than they 
were before the eviction. National development has impoverished and underdeveloped 
them. 
 
The study was guided by the theory of political ecology, which I used in combination 
with the impoverishment risk model, focusing in particular on livelihoods. Data for this 
study was collected through qualitative methods as well as from secondary sources.  
 
Using political ecology, I have been able to argue that the case study reflects a conflict 
over land resources, and struggles and contestations over power and meanings in society. 
The apparent local conflict should also be understood from the global political economy 
perspective.  
 
The findings confirm the impoverishment risk model which argues that during 
displacement or resettlement, unless mitigative measures are taken, it is likely that the 
displaced people would become landless, homeless, jobless and food insecure among 
other negative elements. These risk elements have been found in the study area, and 
according to the respondents, they were a result of the displacement. On the other hand, 
the livelihood analysis shows how individuals and communities have been able to cope in 
the face of change. One of the main lessons from the study is that the project-affected 
people have some agency and are eager to develop themselves rather than wait for 
development to be brought to them by government or foreign investors. Their key 
concern at the moment, however, is lack of a fair compensation. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Development, in one word, can be defined as progress. A longer version could define 
development as a better life for an individual in society or the majority in a population.  
In development discourse it is agreeable that development should be, overall, positive. 
From experience, however, this is easier said than done, as what is perceived as 
‘development’ by some people in a particular society tends to be achieved at the expense 
of other people in the same society. Those affected will view that ‘development’, at least 
at that particular time, as something negative. This is true whether the focus is on a 
family, a small community, a country or the world in general. A definition of 
development offered by Robinson (2002, p.206) illustrates this point thus, ‘Development 
may be thought of as a general process of social and economic change, with profound 
effects for particular individuals in places. At the same time, development is an 
international, or perhaps global, project concerned with mobilizing resources, markets, 
capital and ideas.’ 
 
In a bid to realise her development objectives, Tanzania, as expected, has supported, 
initiated and implemented, several large-scale development projects, ranging from the 
villagisation programme, hydro-electric power and irrigation schemes, to railway lines, 
oil and gas pipelines, and of late, several mining projects. Arguably, in all these schemes, 
projects and programmes, or by any other name, there has been some development. 
However, it is also true that more often than not, these ‘developments’ have been 
accompanied by displacement of people from their original areas of residence and/or 
social and economic activities. 
 
Some have likened development to an omelette, arguing that, if one wants to make an 
omelette, indeed, one has to break some eggs. As a country, Tanzania wants to enjoy the 
development omelette, and it (she) has on a number of occasions ‘broken the 
development eggs’ in the process as I show throughout in this thesis. 
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This research set out to investigate the impact of a 1996 development-induced 
displacement at a mining area in Bulyanhulu, Kahama district, Shinyanga region, to pave 
way for a large-scale, multimillion-dollar, and the largest underground gold mining 
project in Tanzania. While the gold production has increased government revenues by 
millions of dollars, which may be used to finance development in the country as a whole, 
there are claims that between 30,000 and 400,0001 small-scale miners and their families 
were forcibly removed from that area, and greatly affected their livelihoods. No doubt, 
this forceful eviction affected those people’s development, as individuals and as a 
community. On the one hand there is national development, while on the other there is 
individual and/ or community development. Could these two ‘developments’ be 
reconciled? Perhaps yes, perhaps not. 
1.2 Development-Induced Displacement Discourse 
The displacement of people through war, famine, conflict and poverty, and indeed, 
through development itself, is increasingly central to the work of development and 
human rights agencies (Robinson, 2002). During the last decade of the twentieth century, 
at least 200 million people were displaced from their places of domicile because of the 
above causes (Ibid). Development projects, such as dams for electricity, water supply or 
irrigation schemes; airports and highways have had their share in the negative side of 
development. The number of persons involuntarily displaced and resettled by 
infrastructural development between 1990 and 2000, for instance, is estimated to be 
between 90 and 100 million (Cernea and McDowell, 2000). 
 
According to Andrew Gray in McDowell (1996), the proponents of development, as is 
widely defined, ‘…argue that nation-states have to develop, and that the benefits from 
projects should be positively weighed against the social and environmental costs’ (p. 
104).  In this way, development is part of a process where the advantages for the state as 
                                                 
1 The range of the displaced people varies according to source, with the project developers settling for 
a lower number, while the human rights activists citing the highest number. For its part, the 
Government estimated the number to be 200,000. See LEAT (2003). 
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 a whole have to outweigh the desires of the minority. However, more often than not, the 
process of arriving at this decision is not participatory and results in complaints from 
those called ‘minority’. 
 
The background to this argument rests in the legal concept of ‘eminent domain’, which 
consists of a state’s right to expropriate property in certain circumstances. According to 
this perspective, a project may require unpleasant means to fulfil provided the end is both 
politically and economically justifiable in terms of the ‘greater good’. This is also 
referred to as the public interest. 
 
Anthony Oliver-Smith in McDowell (1996) says that development-induced displacement 
is, in many ways, the ultimate expression of a state with its monopoly on the management 
of violence and ability to exert ultimate control over the location of people and things 
within its territory. He adds that, ‘Resettlement imposes forces and conditions on people 
that may completely transform their lives, evoking profound changes in environment, 
productive activities, social organisation and interaction, in leadership and political 
structure, and in worldview and ideology’ (p. 79).  
 
The negative experience from displacement, and the apparent tension between growth or 
economic development for the nation, on the one hand, and social development or justice 
for individuals or communities, on the other, are also reflected by Muggah (2003, p.8). 
As he put it, ‘Development-induced internal displacement also represents, in many cases, 
a violation of human rights, though the overall advantages for the nation have tended to 
outweigh the rights and entitlements of the minority.’ 
 
Other scholars, however, are less compromising and to them, economic development 
should not be attained at the expense of the people it is meant to benefit. B. Pettersson in 
Norwegian Refugee Council (2002, p. 115), says: ‘If the displaced are not properly 
resettled and rehabilitated, it is irrelevant whether the project forcing them off their land 
is of an overriding public interest or not…’ (emphasis in original). 
 
3 
 The World Bank is one single institution that has been involved in most of the major 
infrastructure development programmes throughout the world as a financing partner. In 
that process, the Bank has learnt many lessons with regard to the impacts of the 
development projects on communities and has been developing guidelines and policies to 
deal with the challenges arising thereof. In the preamble to the Bank’s Involuntary 
Resettlement Operational Manual OP 4.12 (revised in April 2004), the World Bank 
(2004) states:  
‘Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under development projects, if 
unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social, and environmental risks: production 
systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or income 
sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be less 
applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social networks 
are weakened, kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the 
potential for mutual help are diminished or lost.’ (§ 1). 
 
Against that background, the World Bank Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (World 
Bank, Ibid.) set three objectives, namely;  
(a) involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized, exploring all viable 
alternative project designs (b) where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities 
should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programmes, providing sufficient 
investment resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to share in project benefits. 
Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate 
in planning and implementing resettlement programmes, and (c) displaced persons should be 
assisted in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore 
them, in real terms, to pre-displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of 
project implementation, whichever is higher. (§.2). 
 
The policy (Ibid., § 3) ‘covers direct economic and social impacts that both result from 
Bank-assisted investment projects, and are caused by the involuntary taking of land 
resulting in relocation or loss of shelter; loss of assets or access to assets; or loss of 
income sources or means of livelihood, whether or not the affected persons must move to 
another location.’ In principle, the World Bank formulated these guidelines or policies in 
1980 (Robinson, 2002). The latest version (quoted above) was reviewed in April 2004. 
4 
 1.3 Research Problem 
In August 1996, the Tanzanian government authorities forcefully evicted thousands of 
small-scale gold miners from an area called Bulyanhulu, Kahama District, Shinyanga 
Region. The small-scale miners, who had started mining gold in the area in as early as 
1970s, were declared illegal. The closure of mining activity affected the livelihoods of 
people, among them miners themselves, business persons and traders, as well as peasants 
who were part and parcel of the mining community. 
 
The government taking control of the mine site and leasing it to a private, multinational 
company, was in line with the reforms in the mining sector that encouraged privatisation 
and liberalisation of the sector as a way of attracting more foreign direct investment 
(FDI). According to the government, the mining activity would be more economical if it 
were to be done by a company with advanced technology to tap the vast and deep-
situated resources. The company, the government asserted, would be responsible for 
environmental conservation, unlike the artisanal miners, who were difficult to monitor, 
and used rudimentary, labour-intensive and environmentally-unfriendly technology. 
Finally, the government hoped to earn more revenue through royalty and various taxes, 
and, according to Tanzanian land legislation, after all, all land is vested into the president, 
who can decide on its use in public interest. 
 
The evictions allowed a Canadian mining exploration company, Sutton Resources, to 
take over the site. Since that time, there have been persistent allegations that as many as 
52 people were buried alive in the mining shafts during the evictions; and that the 
evictions were brutal and swift, violating economic and social rights, causing enormous 
economic and social hardship. The mine was acquired by another Canadian company, 
Barrick Gold Corporation, in 1999. To date, there has never been a comprehensive, 
independent investigation of these allegations (LEAT, 2003). 
 
As a student of development studies, and as a development practitioner, I chose to focus 
my research on the development of the people who were displaced from this mining area 
in order to allow more, bigger and modern development.  
5 
 1.4 Research Questions 
Against that background given in the research problem, I was curious to find out, among 
others: i)          How are the people who were displaced sustaining their livelihoods? 
ii) How do they compare their living conditions or poverty levels now with 
that before the eviction? 
iii) How did or have they engaged the new investor? 
iv) What are their main concerns now? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The research sought to study the socio-economic impact of the Bulyanhulu mine project 
in Tanzania, on the livelihoods of the people who were displaced. Specifically, the 
research objectives were: 
1. To investigate the livelihoods of the displacees in the aftermath of the eviction. 
2. To investigate how the participation of different stakeholders or actors (e.g. the 
affected miners, villagers, investors, the government, civil society) before and 
after the eviction, influenced the process and outcome of the displacement.  
3. With the benefit of hind sight, to draw on major lessons on what could be done 
differently to avoid conflict and negative impacts from similar development-
induced displacement on communities in similar environment in Tanzania and 
globally. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
A research by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that 13 million 
people are engaged directly in small-scale mining activities throughout the world 
(Hentschel et al, 2004). This employment is mainly in developing countries, and the 
livelihoods of a further 80–100 million people are affected by it (Ibid.). While there is 
acknowledgement of the contribution of the small-scale mining sector in the economies 
of the different countries, in general the sector is considered as destructive to the 
environment and mainly as illegal. Increasingly, and especially so in developing 
countries such as Tanzania, most of the mining sites operated by small-scale mines are 
being taken over by large-scale or industrial mining. As a result of this, the livelihoods of 
local mining populations and their dependents have been affected.  
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Tanzania is rich in minerals and gemstones, and currently a number of mining extraction 
and exploration projects are going on in different parts of the country. In the recent past, a 
number of conflicts (some of them violent skirmishes leading to loss of lives) between 
large-scale investors and small-scale miners, with the government caught in between, 
have arisen over the right to the mineral sites. The main complaint in all these conflicts 
has been forceful eviction from the mining sites or blocs and the compensation offered 
being considered unfair by the people being evicted. In some instances, the matters were 
taken to the courts of law and/or the national Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance (CHRGG). Most of the cases, including those launched as way back as 1998, 
are still going on in court. 
 
Given the fact there are many other mining areas with potential for conflict among the 
different actors with a stake (for instance, government, small-scale miners, large-scale 
investors, financial institutions), it can be argued that the findings from this research may 
provide lessons as to what could be done, in future, to attain both economic development 
and social justice, and indeed, national development as well as individual or community 
development.  
 
Another issue of concern is the experience from previous research in other countries 
indicating that in most cases the people who were displaced ended up becoming poorer. 
There is, therefore, a need to study the consequences for the people who were affected in 
this instance in Tanzania. 
 
Finally, the significance of this study is based on my position that the displaced people 
have a story that needs to be told to the world; a story that may lead to, at least, a policy 
change, if not social change at large. Susan Smith in Limb and Dwyer (eds.) (2001, p.27) 
says, ‘Critical social science is about framing research and raising questions in ways that 
are accessible to all those who might make a difference’ (emphasis in original). 
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 1.7 Thesis Organisation 
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the reader to the 
study, giving the background to the study, the objectives of the research and the 
significance of the study. Chapter Two deals with the theoretical aspects of the research. 
The chapter focuses on the theory and frameworks I have used in the study, describing 
their meaning, application, relevance to the study as well as their limitations. The third 
chapter is about the research methodology. In this chapter I describe how I went about in 
collecting data in the field. I make some reflections on the process, and state how my 
position as a researcher influenced the outcome of the research. 
 
In Chapter Four, I provide the context to the study. I start the chapter with a broad 
overview and narrow down to a more specific description that is in line with the 
objectives of the study. Legislation and policies relating to mining in Tanzania are 
discussed in this chapter. Livelihoods of displaced people in the study area are discussed 
in Chapter Five. This chapter is based on testimonies of the people who were actually 
displaced. By and large, their stories are a comparison of their lives before the eviction 
and 10 years afterwards. 
 
Chapter Six dwells on the roles of different actors and how those roles influenced the 
outcome of the displacement, while Chapter Seven attempts to draw major lessons from 
the study. 
 
The last chapter, Chapter Eight, summarizes major conclusions and provide some 
recommendations. It also proposes further studies on the issue of displacement caused by 
large-scale mining projects.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a presentation of the study’s theoretical framework is made. An attempt is 
made to try and link theory and practice in the field. According to Kitchin and Tate 
(2000, p.32), ‘Theory is taken to be a set of explanatory concepts that are useful for 
explaining a particular phenomenon, situation or activity.’ In this study, the phenomenon, 
situation or activity is the 1996 forced displacement of a community at Bulyanhulu to 
pave way for large scale mining development. In chapters Four through Seven, I describe 
the displacement and show how it relates to the theory I have chosen, that is, Political 
Ecology, to study the displacement. 
2.2 Political Ecology 
2.2.1 Meaning and Application 
The main theory that guided the research is Political Ecology with an emphasis on 
political economy taking into account the influence of globalisation. Political economy is 
used here to mean the dynamic interaction between social actors (e.g. the displaced 
communities at Bulyanhulu), economic agents (e.g. the investors), and states (e.g. the 
Government of Tanzania) as they pursue development, wealth and power in national and 
international arenas (Reed, 2001).  
 
From the outset, however, I would like to point out that I am mindful of the several 
definitions given to, as well as the debate around, Political Ecology. As Robbins (2004, 
p.5) says in his book titled Critical Introductions to Geography: Political Ecology, ‘Some 
definitions stress political economy while others point to more formal political 
institutions; some identify environmental change as most important, while others 
emphasise narratives or stories about that change.’ 
 
Early research in political ecology seems to have centrally focused on biophysical 
ecological change of particular environments. By late 1960s, however, ‘writings in 
political ecology focused on unequal power relations, conflict and cultural modernisation 
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 under a global capitalist political economy as key forces in reshaping and destabilising 
human interactions with the physical environment’2 (emphasis supplied). From the 80s to 
the 90s, according to scholars, biophysical political ecology became less central as 
political ecology became more ‘structuralist’. To some critics, the increasing focus of 
political ecology on politics increasingly marginalised the role of ecology. 
 
Robbins (2004), however, shows that some scholars accuse Political Ecology of being 
devoid of political content. As a corrective measure, the critics in this group urge 
researchers using political ecology to pursue a ‘liberation ecology’, where a more 
political theory of political ecology might better direct coherent normative explanations 
of social and environmental change, using materialist conceptions of consciousness, post-
structuralist theories of discourse, and some form of environmental determinism.  
 
Apparently, by 1999, the debate over the direction, and tension among scholars, of 
political ecology, had aroused the interest of some observers as exemplified by Walker 
(2005)3  as he quotes a 1999 publication by Pete Vayda and Brad Walters thus: ‘Indeed, 
it may not be an exaggeration to say that overreaction to the ecology without politics of 
three decades ago is resulting in a politics without ecology.’ 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that at both ends of the spectrum of political 
ecology, questions have been raised, on the one hand some asking, ‘where is the ecology 
in political ecology’,4 while on the other some critics charging that political ecology is 
‘largely without politics or an explicit sensitivity to class interest and social struggle.’5  
 
According to Blaikie (1999, p.5), geographers seem to be divided on their emphasis in 
‘political ecology’: while physical geographers largely ignore the “political” in political 
ecology, human geographers have tended to de-emphasise the “ecology” in political 
ecology. 
                                                 
2 See the article ‘Political Ecology: where is the ecology?’ by Peter A. Walker, Department of Geography, 
University of Oregon, in the journal Progress in Human Geography 29, 1 (2005) pp. 73-82. 
3  Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Robbins (2004) quoted above, p. 206 under ‘Too much theory or too little?’ 
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All said, however, it is my considered view that some of the definitions that could be 
useful in the analysis of the proposed research are given by Robbins (2004, p.6). 
According to the author, who quotes other scholars, Political Ecology can be used to 
‘understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful analysis 
of what one might call the form of access and control over resources and their 
implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods.’ In this case, Robbins 
posits that the goal of Political Ecology would be to explain environmental conflict 
especially in terms of struggles over knowledge, power and practice and politics, justice 
and governance. I discuss these issues in Chapter Six when I look at the roles of different 
stakeholders in what happened at Bulyanhulu. 
 
Robbins (Ibid.) also presents another way to look at Political Ecology saying that it 
combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this 
encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, 
and also within classes and groups within society itself. The goal of Political Ecology in 
this case is to ‘explain environmental change in terms of constrained local and regional 
production choices within global political economic forces, largely within a third world 
and rural context’ (Ibid. p.6). This central feature of political ecology being able to 
explain and link decisions and practices by a person using land, also called land manager, 
to what happens at the other levels of society up to the global level is known as the Chain 
of Explanation. 
 
The term “chain of explanation” was first introduced by geographers Piers Blaikie and 
Harold Brookfield in their seminal publication in 1987, Land Degradation and Society. 
The chain of explanation begins with the individual person who has direct relations with 
the land, and then traces the social relations of production outward and upward to the 
local, national and ultimately, the global scale (Neumann, 2005). 
 
In this study, the chain of explanation has been used to show that the displacement of 
small-scale miners and villagers around Bulyanhulu can be traced to the globalisation 
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 process and free market (capitalism) economy under the influence of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). It has also been used to show how national (state) policies 
have impacted on the livelihoods of the communities in that rural area of Tanzania. 
Furthermore, the chain of explanation has been applied to show the impoverishment and 
marginalization of the various individuals who eked out their living on the land that was 
given away to large-scale miners, who are seen by many in the country as simply greedy 
capitalists. 
2.2.2 Critique and Limitation to Political Ecology 
By comparison, political ecology is a relatively new field and, to some scholars and 
practitioners, it is yet to qualify as a theory per se. When Neumann (2005, p.5) discusses 
the constitution of political ecology he cites other scholars who have referred to political 
ecology differently, including calling it ‘a research agenda’, ‘an approach’, or ‘a 
perspective’. He also notes that increasingly, new modifiers are being attached to the 
term political ecology: ‘poststructuralist’, ‘feminist’, ‘Third World’, ‘antiessentialist’, 
‘critical’, ‘First World’, ‘geographical’, ‘urban’, and even ‘liberation ecology’, the latter 
‘reflecting a growing interest in the relationship of the environment to new social 
movements for entitlements, livelihoods and social justice’ (Ibid., p.6). According to 
Neumann (Ibid), all this goes to show the expansion of and specialization within political 
ecology’s boundary. This can be surmised that, indeed, political ecology is still maturing. 
 
Some scholars have criticized political ecology for being too long on critique and 
explanation but short on policy recommendations (Bryant, 1992). 
 
And as alluded to earlier, while some scholars feel that the subject focuses more on 
ecology than on politics, and others feel the opposite is true, there are some who see 
political ecology as what Robbins (2004) calls ‘too much theory’, and yet others who see 
it as ‘too little theory’. Those in the former group argue that political ecologists 
invariably believe that political economic forces always determine ecological outcomes 
and hence they know the answer before they start to do their research. Their rivals, in the 
latter category, claim that political ecology offer haphazard, contextual, and ad hoc 
accounts following ‘chains of explanation’. 
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To some observers, these two views mean that political ecology, by trying to be all things 
to all people, has failed altogether (Ibid). 
2.2.3 Relevance of Political Ecology to the study 
The events that occurred at Bulyanhulu leading to the forced displacement of people 
could be explained by Political Ecology. Political ecologists work with political, 
economic, and ecological concerns and phenomena, and have looked beyond the local 
community to explain natural resource use, explored power dynamics in everyday 
interactions and formal policy arenas. 
 
One can safely opine that the main social actors in the case under study, namely the 
government, investors and local miners were struggling over knowledge (and 
technology), power (including financial power or capital) and practice (right to 
livelihood through mining). The struggle, furthermore, was also one over politics, justice 
and governance.  
 
Social justice is based on ‘the principle that all persons are entitled to basic human needs, 
regardless of superficial differences such as economic disparity, class, gender, race, 
ethnicity, citizenship, religion, age, sexual orientation, disability, or health. This includes 
the eradication of poverty and illiteracy, the establishment of sound environmental 
policy, and equality of opportunity for healthy personal and social development.’ 6 
 
It can be argued here that the political decisions of the government to evict the small-
scale miners cannot be divorced from economic and environmental considerations by the 
government. The government’s stand point was that, unlike the small-scale miners, the 
big investors would bring in more money while taking good care of the environment. 
 
It can also be posited that the events of Bulyanhulu happened in accordance to the 
realities of globalisation, whereby large-scale, multinational investors are likely to take 
                                                 
6 The concept of ‘Social Justice’ as described in Encyclopaedia (Wikipedia) through Google search 
accessed on 17 April 2006. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_justice.  
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 over production or resources from small enterprises or individual persons. Globalisation, 
which is both a political and economic process, has tended to create winners on the one 
hand, and losers on the other. Globalisation can be said to be a zero-sum game.7 It is a 
foregone conclusion that the winners are the investors who took the land, while the losers 
are those who were displaced. It is debatable whether the government of the day is a loser 
or a winner.  
 
In this study, the issue of globalisation is discussed in light of the movement of capital 
and technology and hence Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); the role of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Transnational Companies (TNCs), and similar events 
happening around the globe. It is also noteworthy that gold mining is a global business 
with global interest. Gold is also used in international markets as a monetary standard. 
Finally, the issue attracted international attention, at least, from civil society organisations 
outside Tanzania as well as from some Western media. 
 
It is this combination of political, economic and environmental factors that led me to 
choose the Political Ecology with an emphasis on political economy, as a theory that 
could be used to guide the research. In this research, I was interested in understanding 
how the displaced people have survived ever since. I feel I was able to accomplish this 
mission since ‘Political Ecology is something that people do, a research effort to expose 
                                                 
7 A zero-sum game is any game where the losses exactly equal the winnings. Most sporting events and 
board games are zero-sum games in the sense that for every winner there is a loser, and winners exist if 
losers exist. When there are large losses to be allocated, any economic decision has a large zero-sum 
element. The economic gains may exceed the economic losses, but the losses are so large as to negate a 
very substantial fraction of the gains. What is more important, the gains are not allocated to the same 
individuals or groups. On average, society may be better off, but this average hides a large number of 
people who are much better off and large numbers of people who are much worse off.  
See Thurow, Lester C. (1980, pp. 11-12). The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for 
Economic Change. New York: Basic Books. 
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 the forces at work in ecological struggle and document livelihood alternatives in the face 
of change’ (Robbins, Ibid.). 
 
And as Keil et al (1998, p.1) say, despite political ecology being ‘a relatively new area of 
critical exploration, and at present raising more questions than it answers… these are 
timely, and in some cases unique questions’ (p.1). 
 
The study has used political ecology as a theoretical framework to describe two major 
phenomena or issues at Bulyanhulu among the people who were affected by the mining 
development project. The following two sections of this chapter briefly discuss the two 
issues under the study, namely Impoverishment and Livelihoods. 
2.3 Impoverishment Risks  
2.3.1 Meaning and Application 
Literature based on previous research on development-induced displacement (e.g. Cernea 
and McDowell, 2000) is replete with negative experiences on the part of the displaced 
people. Examples are drawn from India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania and Sri Lanka, 
to mention but a few. Invariably, the displaced people have tended to be impoverished by 
the development projects that are introduced. Michael Cernea in Cernea and McDowell 
(Ibid.) has identified at least eight consequences, which are basically risks, associated 
with displacement. He mentions the risks as Landlessness; Joblessness; Homelessness; 
Marginalisation; Food insecurity; Increased morbidity and mortality; Loss of access to 
common property assets, and Community disarticulation. 
 
Cernea, who has worked on issues of ‘Resettling and Reconstruction’ for displaced 
populations, developed a model that could be used to mitigate the likely negative impact 
of displacement, including the above mentioned risks. He calls the model 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. 
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 It is my assertion that cutting across Cernea’s IRR Model is the question of human rights 
as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.8 According to the declaration, 
is, a people are entitled to different rights and freedoms, including right to a residence, 
gainful employment, owning property, a healthy life, and participation in dealing with 
issues of their concern. In sum, a people are entitled to a sustainable livelihood, which is 
more than making a living in an economic sense. 
 
This study, among other objectives, set out to investigate the impact of displacement on 
the lives of the affected people. According to the World Bank Resettlement Operational 
Guidelines (2004), the resettled people must have their living conditions at a better or 
restored to the same level as prior to displacement. It is against this background that the 
question of whether there was impoverishment or not becomes relevant. The issue of 
impoverishment is also raised in the political ecology as one of the areas for study. 
 
 
In my study, however, I chose to focus on four components or risks identified by the IRR 
model, namely landlessness, homelessness, joblessness and food insecurity. No doubt, 
these four components are crucial to any community in attaining sustainable livelihoods. 
I decided to limit the scope to only some (these four) of the components in order to have 
a sharper focus on few issues rather than trying to deal with everything. Time available 
for fieldwork was also an issue that was considered. 
 
2.4 Livelihood Analysis 
2.4.1 Meaning and Application 
Long (2001, p. 241) describes livelihoods as being ‘made up of practices by which 
individuals and groups strive to make a living, meet their consumption necessities, cope 
with adversities and uncertainties, engage with new opportunities, protect existing or 
pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and fulfil their social obligations.’ 
Moseley and Logan (2004, p.3) define livelihood systems as ‘the assets (natural, physical, 
                                                 
8 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1948. 
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 human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by 
institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the 
individual or household.’ This definition is close to the one offered by Chambers and 
Conway (1992) as quoted by Ellis (2000, p.7) ‘wherein a livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a 
means of living.’  
 
The concept of livelihood has been used by researchers who want to understand how 
individuals or communities, especially when threatened by poverty, have been able to 
survive or cope with change thrust upon them by external factors. The external factors 
could be natural or man-made, and may include failing weather condition or state-
sponsored market or land policies. According to experience, the survival or coping of 
these individuals or communities have been made possible through livelihood 
diversification. Although it is possible to talk of diversification as a way of increasing 
accumulation, that is, diversification taken voluntarily by choice; in case of distress or 
hardship, the livelihood diversification would be involuntary, carried out as a matter of 
necessity. 
 
The ability of an individual to cope with an adverse condition and/ or recover from a 
shock or stress would depend on a number of factors including the range of assets owned 
by the individual before the disturbance in the livelihood. Quoting a 1992 publication (by 
Chambers and Conway), Moseley and Logan (2004, p. 4) suggest that ‘a livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintains or 
enhances its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base.’ Indeed, research has shown that communities can diversify their 
livelihoods ‘in order to survive or improve their standards of living’ (Ibid. p.127). 
 
One of my research objectives was to investigate the livelihoods of the displaced people 
ten years after the eviction. I wanted to understand how they have been able to cope with 
the situation and survive. I return to this issue at length in Chapter Five. 
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 2.5 Linking Political Ecology to Impoverishment Model and Livelihood Analysis 
My research questions and objectives revolve around the livelihoods of the displaced 
people and whether or not the displacement affected their poverty levels. I invoke 
Political Ecology to argue that central to both the affected livelihoods and the 
displacement was the land resource. Land is both a political and an economic entity. As 
such political ecology deals with political economy issues. As Paulson et al (2005, p.27) 
put it, political economy is concerned with effects ‘on people, as well as on their 
productive activities, of on-going changes within society at local and global levels’ …and 
is ‘synonymous with economic and ecological distributional conflicts.’  
 
In this thesis I show that the displacement that occurred is connected to global interests 
that can be traced beyond the local community. The displacement, which might have 
contributed to the impoverishment of the local mining community, can be linked to the 
power relations among the different stakeholders. According to Paulson et al (Ibid., 
p.27), political ecology is based on ‘research on practices and negotiations of power 
relations both among resource users and between resource-using communities and 
outside holders of power.’ At the same time, however, the individuals in the community, 
impoverished as they could be, they are coping to sustain their livelihoods. These issues 
are discussed further in chapters Four through Six. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline how I went about collecting data for this thesis in the field, the 
field being both the relevant locations I visited in the course of data collection, and the 
sources of such information. The field, therefore, comprised Dar es Salaam, the 
government seat of Tanzania, where most institutions relevant to the study are located, 
and Bulyanhulu where the displacement under study took place. Apart from Dar es 
Salaam and Bulyanhulu, I also travelled to Arusha to meet a key informant, and I spent a 
day in Geita, a place close to, and with similar characteristics or fate, as Bulyanhulu, the 
main study area. I spent six weeks in Tanzania for this purpose, between June and August 
2006. I should add, however, that the field also included the various documents, in form 
of books and reports, that I accessed in Norway, both prior to my travel to Tanzania, and 
after my return to Norway, as well as those I got while in Tanzania. 
3.2 Research Process 
Before going to Tanzania I reviewed relevant literature in relation to development-
induced displacement in general and contacted some sources who knew about the 
Bulyanhulu case in particular. I informed them about my planned visit and asked for their 
help in terms of more contacts and documented reports on the case. I also acquainted 
myself with issues around livelihoods, mining and qualitative methods through reading. 
 
I reflected about the kind of questions I would ask during my interviews (see interview 
guide in Appendix 1) before I went to meet the different respondents, depending on what 
I perceived as their role on the research questions, their knowledge, or expert opinion on 
the issues under discussion. For individual victims or survivors, therefore, the key issues 
were on land, employment (job), house (home), food and other issues related to 
livelihoods, including diversification (e.g. assets, networks and social capital). As for 
government officials main questions centred on laws, policies, regulations and statistics, 
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 while for academicians I tried to seek their opinion on the subject, advice on relevant 
literature, and other contacts in the area under discussion. 
 
It took me longer than I had anticipated getting contacts and appointments with 
government and mining companies (including other companies besides KMCL). One of 
the reasons for this unavailability of the key officials can be explained by the timing of 
the fieldwork. In Tanzania, during June-August it is the budget session and most of the 
senior officers are involved in this process and some travel to the parliament outside the 
capital. Those who stay behind dedicate their time to responding to queries from 
members of parliament. At the same time, during that period an international trade fair 
usually takes place in Dar es Salaam, which again, takes time of some of the officials, 
including those from the private sector whose organisations participate in the exhibitions. 
The mining company (KMCL) did not respond to my appointment request despite several 
follow-ups. As for the police force, it took them about 10 months to provide me with 
some data on the incidences related to land conflicts (See Appendix 3). 
3.3 Data Collection Methods 
Conventionally, research methods can be divided into quantitative, qualitative and 
participatory research methods, each with differing underlying approaches, tools and 
techniques. However, as Mayoux (2006) in Desai and Potter (eds.) (2006) says, the 
divides are becoming increasingly breached as now there is a constructive cross-
fertilisation of tools and more integrated methodologies to build on the complementarities 
between different methods.  
 
Mayoux adds that for each research method, strengths and weaknesses are not always 
absolute, but depend very much on how particular methods and tools are used and 
whether they are used ‘well’ or ‘badly’, because what may be potential strengths in 
relation to one context or purpose, may be potential weaknesses in others. For instance, 
the very openness and flexibility of qualitative methods may lead to, or be construed as, 
lack of focus, while quantitative methods may be accused of trying to measure the 
‘immeasurable’.  
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 I decided to collect data using Qualitative methods. Contrasted to quantitative methods, 
qualitative methods deal, in an intensive manner, with smaller number of samples, and do 
not apply mathematical methods in analysis. I planned to study few people in a small 
community. 
 
I chose Qualitative methods because they provide the opportunity to understand the 
complex realities and processes as well as underlying strategies and constraints. In this 
research, I sought to understand ‘lived experience and to reflect on and interpret the 
understandings and shared meanings of (displaced) people’s everyday social worlds and 
realities’ and I sought ‘subjective understanding of social reality rather than statistical 
description or generalisable predictions’ (Limb and Dwyer, 2001, p.6). 
 
In this research, I wanted to get the story of the displaced people out to the world, and 
qualitative interviews are methodologically suitable in this case ‘because they allow a 
wide range of experiences to be documented, voices to be heard, representations to be 
made and interpretations to be extracted’ (Ibid. p.29).  
3.3.1 In-depth Interviews 
Face-to-face in-depth interviews with selected evictees were carried out to gain insight 
into how they are managing after the displacement. The focus of these interviews was on 
the livelihoods. Questions focused on issues of land, housing, employment and quality of 
life in general and aimed at comparing the livelihoods before the eviction and that after 
the eviction. While I aimed at getting good insight into community experiences from the 
in-depth interviews, I acknowledge that the method was time-consuming.  
 
I conducted these interviews with 11 respondents from Bulyanhulu area, obtained 
through snow-balling. With the exception of the leaders of the small-scale miners, I have 
kept other respondents anonymous.  
 
I was able to meet most of these respondents without prior appointments or them 
indicating signs of reluctance, with the exception of one interviewee, who questioned the 
use of my research, arguing that researchers had come and gone without any 
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 improvement to their living conditions. He was later very cooperative and he even 
showed me some of the copies of the documents as he wanted to prove his arguments. 
This respondent was among the local leaders of the village.  
 
Most of the interviews took place at the respondents’ homes and without the presence of 
other people. I hope this privacy provided confidence and promoted openness on the part 
of the respondents. I remember in one instance, however, as I was interviewing a 
respondent in his home, a visitor came, and he listened to our interview, and he even 
contributed to the responses of the host. Sometimes, they would ask one another to 
confirm, for instance, a date or an event. In general, the interview atmosphere was fine 
and I believe the respondents were as honest as they could remember. 
 
My interviewees comprised leaders or former leaders of the miners association 
(committee) or village government and other people who had not held any leadership 
position. I found those who were, or had been, leaders were more exposed and more 
knowledgeable. They were more articulate and, perhaps, more ‘political’. Most of them 
also still ran some small businesses; one had a small shop (kiosk), another had a car 
which was for hire, and others had just established new mining pits in the outer villages 
where their operations, however, were also considered as illegal.  
3.3.2 Focus Group Discussions 
On this method, Desai and Potter (2006) argue that focus groups provide a good method 
for accessing group viewpoints and perceptions, highlighting differences between 
participants. Focus groups, which are accessible to people with low literacy levels, such 
as those in the area under research, are commonly used to ascertain information on 
collective views of social issues. They are considered as good for dealing with a sensitive 
topic, and can generate rich and abundant data. By their nature, they are relatively 
participatory and empowering and can lead to collective action. This seems to be in line 
with one of the characteristics of Political Ecology, that of being considered liberating 
and activist. 
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 In my plans, I had proposed to conduct Focus Group Discussions (4 at most) to get more 
insight into some of the responses obtained from the in-depth interviews. However, while 
in the field I realised that the respondents’ stories were similar and there was not any 
issue that I could consider as controversial that needed ‘many discussions’ to arrive at a 
consensus. That view was also given weight by the fact that I had fewer days to spend at 
Bulyanhulu than I had earlier anticipated. I therefore held one Focus Group Discussion, 
in which 12 people, 6 men and 6 women, participated. I asked them (the participants) 
whether they would mind to be in a mixed group (men and women) and they confirmed 
that they would not mind. Both men and women were active during the discussion and it 
did not appear that gender could have affected their participation. Of these 12, one person 
had already taken part in the in-depth interviews. 
 
The participants in this Focus Group Discussion did not know that they would take part 
in such a forum nor had I planned for that on that day. What happened was that as I was 
visiting some small-scale miners at some place, word had gone around the village, and 
people just came to see the visitor or the intruder, that is, me. The person, who had taken 
me to the area, then explained to them what I was doing in the area. I also explained to 
them the purpose of my mission and asked them whether they could be ready to talk to 
me. I talked to them on a one-on-one basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. 1 Focus group discussion with some respondents at Namba Mbili village 
    Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006 
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I can, therefore, say recruitment was spontaneous and the participants were all the people 
who had been affected by the displacement. Their viewpoints in the discussion were not 
so different. I managed the discussion by asking questions and taking notes myself. Two 
other people who had accompanied me to the area and a hired driver did not take part and 
kept themselves at a distance. In general, there was domination by a particular member of 
the group and I tried to give everybody a chance to speak, sometimes rephrasing the 
questions and probing so that participants would contribute more in their own words 
other than saying “I agree with the previous speaker”. The discussion centred on two 
main issues that I had picked during the interviews and that I thought needed some 
discussion in order to get more insight into as well as clarifying some of the issues raised 
by different interviewees. From the in-depth interviews, I felt I needed more discussion 
on the view of the mining community as regards development and their main concern at 
the time. See Appendix 2. The main conclusions from this discussion are discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
3.3.3 Key Informant Interview 
I interviewed a number of key informants from relevant offices at both the national and 
local level. At the national level I was able to interview officials from the Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals which is responsible for all sectoral matters pertaining to mining in 
Tanzania. As well, I contacted the National Environment Management Council and the 
Division of Environment, both of which deal with matters relating to management of the 
environment including issues such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
which is required for approval of large projects that may affect communities. 
 
I also interviewed academicians with the University of Dar es Salaam and the University 
College of Lands and Architectural Studies (UCLAS) for their expert opinion on the 
issues under study. I also approached the World Bank (Country Office) for their 
experience and involvement in the project and in similar ones around the world.  
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  I was able to meet the Songosongo Natural Gas Project officials, the project of which 
displaced thousands of people, but todate, it seems “everybody” was pleased with the 
displacement. Here I wanted to compare the experiences and lessons learnt. 
 
Additionally, I met with representatives of two civil society organisations whose 
members or stakeholders have been affected by such displacement or mining 
development in general. These organisations, national in nature, deal with environmental 
and land rights in particular and human rights in general.  
 
I also held talks with a representative of an international non-governmental organisation 
working in the area (CARE International), as well as with a coordinator of a local NGO. 
Other key informants included ward and village executives and politicians. 
 
Besides planning to meet the mining company that now occupies the area hitherto under 
the displaced communities at Bulyanhulu, I also wanted to interview officials from other 
mining companies whose projects have also displaced people. The two projects I chose 
are Geita Gold Mine project under the AngloGold Ashanti Geita Gold Mine, and the 
Nzega Golden Pride Mining Project run by Resolute Tanzania. I was able to interview a 
representative of the Geita Gold Mine in Dar es Salaam.  
 
It was difficult to get details from the Nzega project because they insisted that I should 
travel to Nzega, and meet the community there, which I would have liked to do, but their 
confirmation for the same was late and came while I was already at Bulyanhulu 
conducting my fieldwork. It was a pity that their Dar es Salaam office was not authorized 
to provide me with the information I wanted. However, it is sad to note that the mining 
company whose project is at the centre of this study did not grant me an interview despite 
receiving my letter of introduction and a personal briefing on the proposed research. 
3.3.4 Unstructured Interviews 
I conducted numerous interviews, unstructured, with different people, whenever possible. 
These included the people I met as I tried to go around the mining centre and in the 
village, in shops, at restaurants; or when I boarded vehicles (buses and taxis) or when I 
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 rode on hired bicycles, as well as when I travelled between Mwanza-Sengerema-Geita-
Kahama. The information they provided invariably tallied with what I had got from other 
sources and observed. 
3.3.5 Field observation  
While in the research study area, I tried to observe features that are related to the research 
questions, such as farms, houses and life standards, as a way of evaluating and validating 
some of the responses provided by the respondents vis- a-vis their livelihoods.  
 
In the course of my visit to various places in the area I took some photographs with my 
camera, and when the people were to be included in the photo, I requested for their 
permission. 
3.4 Reflections on data collection process 
At the time of my visit to Tanzania, and until todate, the issue of small-scale miners 
versus large and foreign investors is, in general, politically sensitive. This is compounded 
by the allegations of the killings of small-scale miners at Bulyanhulu and at other mining 
areas. In 2002, the government instituted sedition charges against two environmental 
lawyers and human rights activists and a prominent politician over the issue of alleged 
killings. The case is still pending in court. On the other hand, some of the displaced 
people at Bulyanhulu had a court case awaiting trial, in which they are challenging the 
mining company and the government over the compensation they received or never 
received when they were evicted. 
 
The public feeling then, as now (at the time of writing the report), is one of displeasure 
with the large scale-miners, who are viewed as plunderers of the Tanzanian economy and 
abusers of human rights of their local or indigenous staff as well as the local communities 
surrounding them. At the same time, the public views the Government of Tanzania as 
weak and most likely corrupt, and one that is not concerned with the plight of its citizens 
and especially the poor, rural, displaced communities. 
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 It is also noteworthy that at the time of my visit to Tanzania, the government had just 
announced that it had embarked on a process to review all the mining contracts with 
large-scale investors and would possibly cancel those that do not seem to be of public 
interest. 
 
I am of the view that these circumstances could have made the respondents, especially 
those from the government, at all levels, to be sensitive and avoid sharing information. I 
have a feeling that most people in general and the mining companies especially, thought I 
was sent by the government to spy on the dealings in the mining sector. It should not, 
therefore, be surprising that the Kahama Mining Company shunned my request for 
information. 
 
On the other hand, the people who were evicted could also have tended to exaggerate 
their suffering, probably hoping to get some or more compensation. I dealt with these 
issues diplomatically but openly to avoid creating false hopes and actually ‘doing more 
harm than good’.  
 
I can also mention that the people affected by the project were enthusiastic to share their 
stories with me, and they looked at me as a saviour of some sort, having known that I had 
gone there all the way from Dar es Salaam where I lived, and Europe where I studied. 
They insisted that I should get their story out, loud and clear, on how miserable they 
were. They were unanimous that all they wanted was a fair compensation before they 
could leave the area, if need be, and go to establish themselves sustainably elsewhere. 
 
Let me say a few words about validity of my study. Kvale (1996, p. 238) describes 
validity as ‘the degree that a method investigates what it is intended to investigate to the 
extent to which our observations indeed reflect the phenomena or variables of interest to 
us.’ This means it may be difficult to have a universal validity. However, to improve 
research validity in terms of credibility, plausibility and trustworthiness of the findings, I 
used several tactics to test and confirm the findings. I tried, for instance, to have a sample 
of respondents from among the people displaced, their leaders, local organisations, local 
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 politicians, weighing evidence. I also looked for evidence from similar displacement, and 
checked out rival explanations. This is in line with the suggestions given by Kvale (Ibid. 
p. 242). That is also why I decided to use a number of methods simultaneously, that is, 
in-depth interviews, focus groups and observations, supplemented by secondary sources. 
The body language of respondents during the interviews and discussions was also 
considered as it could provide some hints for the evaluation of the respondents. 
 
All said, however, I am confident that the respondents in the community represented, in 
general, the view of the wider community affected by the displacement. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
I analysed the data I gathered on the basis of the theory of political ecology, against the 
impoverishment risk model, particularly focusing on livelihoods. From the different 
responses I looked for similarities and differences. This enabled me to make some 
generalisations. I then clustered issues of interest relating to these three parameters 
according to the research objectives. I also compared and related the information I 
received from informants with what I had read from secondary sources to generate 
meaning. 
 
In my in-depth interviews with the displaced people, I was conscious of the possibility of 
exaggeration of the claims by the respondents. For such a community, which feels it has 
been negatively affected by the project, it is more likely to project the situation as a 
completely hopeless one. This is understandable and as Yeager and Miller (1988, pp. 
173) put it, ‘Exaggeration is a sign of passive resistance to the curtailed livelihood source 
and style. It is also a way of trying to redress the imbalance of power; hoping that they 
will move sympathy and probably help from powers that be and Good Samaritans.’ 
However, I did not find any evidence of such exaggeration, and whenever I suspected 
that a respondent could be exaggerating, I tried to cross-check that information with other 
respondents. 
 
In chapters Four through Seven I focus on the findings of the study based on the 
secondary sources of data as well as on the interviews I held with different respondents. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS TO THE STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the context into which the study is placed. It does so by first giving 
the historical background of mining in Tanzania and identifying the two categories of 
mining in terms of the actors. It then highlights the various legislation and policies in as 
far as they impact on the sector as a whole, and finally touches on the issue of 
displacement as a result of mining activities in the country. The chapter ends with a 
discussion that summarizes the context into which the study is placed within the political 
ecology. 
4.2 Overview of Mineral Sector in Tanzania 
Tanzania is endowed with various valuable natural resources including minerals of 
different quantities and quality. According to Bagachwa and Limbu (1995, p. 254), ‘The 
catalogue of Tanzania’s minerals discovered so far include: Precious metals (gold, silver 
and platinoid); base metals and other metals (zinc, lead, copper, nickel, tin, tungsten, 
cobalt and beach sand minerals); ferrous metals (iron and chromium); and precious stones 
and gemstones (diamonds, rubies, tanzanite, gem garnets, emeralds, tourmaline, spinel, 
zircon, sapphire and peridot). Also found are industrial minerals (graphite, mica, kaolin, 
bauxite etc); energy minerals (coal, gas, uranium, petroleum, etc) and evaporates (salt, 
soda ash, gypsum limestone, etc).’ By 1998, Tanzania had over 800,000 sq. km. of varied 
geological terrains with under-explored and under-developed minerals environment 
(MEM, 1998). 
 
As in many other African countries, mining activities in Tanzania are historically 
traceable to the pre-colonial period and most known activities at the time consisted of 
mining and working of iron, copper and salt. However, ‘unlike the other minerals which 
were primarily exploited by Africans, gold was exploited on some scale by Arab traders’ 
(Chachage, 1993, p. 90). And as it will be shown later, during the colonial period under 
the Germans and subsequently the British, the natives were prohibited to extract gold, 
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 which was undertaken by colonialists and (their) companies from South Africa and 
Britain. 
 
After the independence of Tanganyika in 1961 and following the Arusha Declaration of 
1967, which sought to put all the pillars of the economy under the state (nationalization 
policy under the Ujamaa centrally planned economy), basically all mining activities were 
placed under the state. The government established its own firm, State Mining 
Corporation (STAMICO) to oversee all mining activities in the country. This state of 
affairs continued until in the 1990s when the government adopted economic liberalization 
policies, otherwise known as Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), which allowed and 
encouraged private investors and especially foreign-based into the mining sector. 
Because of the favourable mining investment climate in as far as the investors were 
concerned, between 1995 and 2005, seven large-scale mines had come on stream, six of 
them gold mines (MEM, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Metallogenic map of Tanzania 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals, MEM (2005). 
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 4.2.2 Small-Scale Mining 
Mining can be categorised as small-scale or large-scale on the basis of financial capital 
invested; sophistication of technology and equipment used; the area under exploitation 
worked upon, and the number of people directly involved in the mining process.  
 
In the case of small-scale mining, such a process could be run by a family and the capital 
could have been raised through self-financing. The technology involved is relatively 
crude and manual, and the area under exploitation owned by one person could be just a 
few hectares. The people involved in this process can therefore be identified as small-
scale miners; or ‘small miners, also called artisans, galampsey, creusseurs or pailleurs’ 
(Chachage, 1993, p. 98). 
 
Traditionally, mining activities in Tanzania have been carried out by small-scale or 
artisanal miners. During the pre-colonial era and given the subsistence level of economy 
obtaining in the country ever since, most of the mining and metal works were carried out 
by blacksmiths and silversmiths. This reality continued during the colonial period and 
even after their departure. According to Chachage (1993), it was essentially small-scale 
miners who dominated gold production in the 1920s. Companies (mainly medium and 
small-scale) from South Africa and Britain entered the scene in the mid-1930s. Most of 
these had closed down by 1965, as a result of sanctions against South Africa and the low 
price of gold. Despite the departure of the companies, gold production continued in the 
hands of small-scale miners from the 1960s to the present. 
 
There have been various estimates of the number of small-scale miners who have been 
operating in the country since the 1990s. According to Butler (2004), the ILO estimated 
in 1999 that there were between 450,000 and 600,000 artisanal miners employed in 
small-scale mining in Tanzania. On the other hand, Reed (2001) had estimated one 
million small-scale miners to have moved into the largely unregulated yet very dynamic 
small-scale mining sector during the 1990s. The estimate by Reed was based on 
projections from a study conducted by Tan-Discovery, a consulting firm, which stated 
that more than 555,000 people were directly involved in mining, and another by the 
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 Federation of Miners Associations of Tanzania (FEMATA) which estimated that 550,000 
people were directly engaged in mining activities in 1997. It should be pointed out here 
that most of the small-scale miners operate in gold production. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2 A miner sieving ores suspected to contain gold. 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006 
 
Unofficial projection by an official with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals estimated 
the number of artisanal miners by mid-2006 to be about one million-and-a half. Despite 
the fact that there have been more mineral discoveries and especially gold rushes in the 
different parts of the country even after 1999, and that one should therefore have 
expected the number of small-scale miners to swell even further, it should be noted that 
most of those areas where the small miners worked have been taken over by large-scale 
miners. I was also informed by a respondent from the World Bank, that a project dealing 
with small-scale mining was being prepared, that among other things would conduct a 
census of all small miners, so that they are better assisted in their production and 
marketing processes. In the meantime, the official working figure for the number of 
small-scale miners in Tanzania can be taken to be 1.5 million. This number is by no 
means small and is about 7 per cent of the country’s estimated labour force of 2005. 
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 Before the end of the chapter, I will discuss the contribution of small-scale gold mining 
as well as that of large-scale mining to the economy as a whole. But now I turn to large-
scale mining in Tanzania. 
4.2.3 Large-Scale Mining 
Large-scale mining in Tanzania is currently done by multinational companies, mainly 
originating from Canada, Australia and South Africa and the main area of exploitation is 
on gold. Between 1995 and 2005, Tanzania witnessed commissioning of seven large-
scale mines, six of them gold mines. Other large-scale mining is on diamond and 
tanzanite. Table 4.1 below summarises some of the on-going projects, their location, year 
of commission, and both the estimated annual production and reserves of each mine. The 
data was extracted from the 2005 publication by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
titled Tanzania Opportunities for Mineral Resource Development (p.2 and p. 44).  
 
Table 4. 1 Major gold mines in Tanzania by July 2006 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Mine    Annual production (rated capacity) Estimated reserves 
(year commissioned)             (ounces)   (ounces)  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Golden Pride (Nzega) 
(1998)      200,000   2.8 million 
 
Geita Gold Mine (Geita) 
(2000)      600,000   20.0 million 
 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (Bulyanhulu) 
(2001)      400,000   14.6 million 
 
Afrika Mashariki Gold Mine (Mara) 
(2002)      280,000   4.1 million 
 
Tulawaka Gold Project (Biharamulo)  
(2005)      100,000   1.7 million 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: MEM, 2005, (p. 2 and p. 44). 
It should be noted here that most of this large-scale mining started in late 1990s mainly 
because of the favourable investment regime that was provided by both the Mineral 
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 Policy of Tanzania of 1997 and the Mining Act of 1998. These will be discussed below. 
Contrary to small-scale mining, which is labour intensive, large-scale mining employs 
relatively very few people. According to the Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy 
(TCME), for instance, the large-scale mining has created about 8,000 direct jobs in the 
sector.  
 
The Chamber of Mines is basically a lobby group and claims to have a membership of 
about 50 participants drawn from ‘a broad spectrum of key players in the mining industry 
including small-scale miners, individuals, small, medium to the largest international 
mining companies in the world who have identified Tanzania as a worthwhile investment 
destination’ (TCME, 2006). This is a quotation from a brochure printed by the chamber. 
The brochure lists the members in terms of categories as senior companies (all 
multinational mining companies), junior companies (these mainly do exploration and 
include one state coal mine), senior associates (mainly service providers including a bank 
and an oil company), junior associates (again mainly related service providers but 
includes a regional – southern and eastern Africa-mineral centre), and individuals (these 
are mostly private local consulting firms). 
 
Although they are said to be members of TCME, it does not seem that the small-scale 
miners of Tanzania belong to this grouping. Efforts to meet officials of the chamber 
during the fieldwork in Tanzania to clarify on this membership among other things were 
not successful. 
4.2.4 Mineral Sector Development 
The mineral sector has been steadily increasing its contribution to the overall national 
economy, in terms of GDP, from, for instance, less than 1 per cent in the 1980s (TCME, 
2006) through 3.0 per cent in 2003, to 3.2 per cent in 2004 and 3.5 per cent in 2005 
(Tanzania Economic Survey, 2004; 2005). The target set by the Mineral Policy is to 
contribute 10 per cent of GDP by the year 2025. It is likely that this target could be 
reached given the on-going mineral exploration work that has discovered resources in 
excess of 45 million ounces of gold, 1.5 million tonnes of nickel and 50 million carats of 
tanzanite (MEM, 2005).  
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Table 4. 2 Mineral sector growth over the years 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Indicator     Year  Number/Value 
Prospecting and mining licences  1990  9 
2001 250 
2004 3,000 
2006 (mid) 6,8009 
 
 Total mineral exports     1996   USD 15m 
2004 USD 672m 
2005 USD 693m 
 
Proceeds from gold exports alone   1982  USD 200,000 
      2004  USD 630m 
      2005  USD 655m 
Source: MEM, 2005; Tanzania Economic Survey, 2004; 2005. 
 
Government reports (e.g. MEM, 2005; Tanzania Economic Survey, 2004; 2005) depict a 
picture of rapid growth in the mining sector. For instance, during the last ten years 
foreign investment into the mining sector was about USD 2.5 billion of which USD 1.5 
billion was Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Table 4.2 above summarises these figures. 
Tanzania is now the third largest gold producer in Africa behind South Africa and Ghana. 
 
The government has often tended to attribute the recent achievements in the mining 
sector, almost solely, to the entry of large-scale, foreign-owned mining companies. In a 
way, denigrating the important role played hitherto and currently by the artisanal miners. 
For instance, Tanzania’s artisanal mining sector generated an average USD 30 million 
annually in official gold exports between 1990 and 1994, from 13.84 tonnes of gold 
                                                 
9 The figure for 2006 was obtained from an official of the Ministry of Minerals and Energy during an 
interview 
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 produced by small miners during the period (Dreschler, 2001).  That amount was only 
surpassed in 1999 when Bulyanhulu Mine entered into production. In 1992, according to 
Dreschler, 76 per cent of all mineral export earnings (in Tanzania) came from gold 
mining by artisanal miners (2001, p. 81). Despite technological advancement globally, 
Chachage (1993) had a similar observation when he said over 40 per cent of gold in Sub-
Saharan Africa was still being produced by artisanal miners. 
 
Having looked at the development of the mineral sector in the country over the recent 
years, I will now focus on the legal and institutional framework in so far as mining is 
concerned. 
4.3 Institutional and Legal Framework for Mining in Tanzania 
The legal and institutional environment that informs the mineral sector in the country is 
consistent with, and has been influenced by, the political and economic reforms that the 
government of Tanzania has been taking since the early 1980s. In short, the framework 
follows the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), which favours a private sector-led 
economic management and development and encourages the government to focus mainly 
on governance issues generally. The role of government shifted from that of owning and 
operating mines to that of providing policy guidelines, regulations, stimulating private 
investment in mining and providing support for investors (MEM, 1997). It can be noted 
that the shift was a change from the post-independence Ujamaa policies, which dictated 
that all pillars of the economy be placed under and run by the state. 
4.3.1 Mining Laws 
The main instruments governing mining in the country are the Mineral Policy of 1997, 
Mining Act, 1998 and Mining Regulations, 1999. The Mineral Policy has as its main 
objective to ‘attract and enable the private sector to take the lead in exploration, mining 
development, mineral beneficiation and marketing’ (MEM, 1997, p. 8). The policy, 
together with the Act, has, therefore, provided what can be described as “incentives” 
through “competitive” fiscal regime, legal and regulatory framework. Investors, for 
instance, enjoy numerous tax exemptions, including tax holiday (grace period before they 
can start paying some taxes) and are free to repatriate profits. 
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It is noteworthy, however, to mention the role of International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) in this “favourable” mining environment, notably the World Bank. According to 
Butler (2004), it would be difficult to over-emphasize the role that the World Bank has 
played in catalysing the privatisation and reform of Tanzania’s mineral sector. In 1993-
94, the World Bank initiated a five-year Mineral Sector Technical Assistance Project for 
Tanzania, designed to “introduce a legal, regulatory and fiscal framework, which would 
provide an environment conducive to private investment in mining.” The project included 
assistance in rewriting relevant national legislation such as the new Investment Act, 1997 
and the new Mining Act, 1998 to “harmonize” Tanzania’s legislation with the 
requirements of the new global political economy (2004, p. 68). 
 
Accordingly, today the investment climate in Tanzania is such that foreign and local 
investors, including investors in mining, are protected against nationalization. Property 
guarantees and political risks are provided under the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). Settlement of disputes between a foreign investor and the Government 
of Tanzania may be arbitrated through ‘arbitration laws of Tanzania for investors; the 
rules of procedure for arbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID); and within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral 
agreement on investment protection agreed to by the government of the country from 
which the investor originates’ (MEM, 2005, p. 9). Both the MIGA and ICSID are 
affiliated with the World Bank. 
4.3.2 Environmental Laws 
The Mining Act, 1998 has specific environmental regulations known as the Mining 
(Environmental Management and Protection) Regulations, 1999. For instance, any 
developer applying for a Special Mining Licence, Mining Licence or Gemstone Mining 
Licence is required to include a feasibility study which sets out the proposed programme 
of mining operations and which must be accompanied by an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) and the Environmental Management Plan (EMP). EIA is a planning 
tool used to integrate environmental considerations in the decision-making process, in 
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 order to ensure that unnecessary damage to the environment is avoided. The EMP shows 
how the different issues identified in the assessment (EIA) will be addressed. This 
requirement is also stated in the National Environmental Policy of 1997. The recent 
Environmental Management Act, 2004 has also emphasized the need to take into 
consideration the social aspects during the Environmental Impact Assessment rather than 
focusing solely on the physical environment characteristics as had been the case. 
 
During the interview with an official with the National Environment Management 
Council (NEMC) it came to light that despite having detailed laws and regulations most 
of the time they were not followed or adhered to by the mining companies. While it is 
true that most of the large-scale and internationally financed mining projects do conduct 
EIAs prior to the commissioning of their projects, most of the time there is no monitoring 
and evaluation of the performance after the projects take off. The official attributed this 
to a number of factors including lack of resources on the part of enforcing agencies to 
conduct monitoring and evaluation as necessary; low awareness and acceptance on the 
need to have EIAs in the first place; unregulated trade liberalisation or market forces, and 
what he termed as ‘political interference’ but which he associated with corrupt practices, 
either political or financial corruption, by responsible parties. 
4.3.3 Land Laws 
There are at least three laws relating to administration of land that can, in one way or 
another, have a bearing on mining activities. These are the Land Acquisition Act, 1967; 
Land Act, 1999, and the Village Land Act, 1999. The laws, for instance, provide that all 
land belong to the state and that the presidency is entrusted to hold it on behalf of the 
public. The President may acquire any land where such land is required for any public 
purpose, such purposes including ‘for or in connection with mining for minerals or oil’ 
(URT, 1968). The laws also provide that if the President resolves that any land is required 
for a public purpose (such as mining), the Minister for the time responsible for lands shall 
give notice of intention to acquire the land to the persons interested or claiming to be 
interested in such land. The laws further provide for the people to be affected by such 
land take-over to negotiate with the government and agree over a fair compensation. 
Ideally, the laws are very clear on the process to be followed and to ensure that there are 
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 minimum misunderstandings between the project-affected people and the party, whether 
private or public, that will come to develop the land in question.  
 
Experience, however, has shown that more often than not the process has not been 
followed nor the procedures being adhered to, much to the dissatisfaction of the affected 
people and sometimes leading to conflicts. In most of the major mining projects that have 
been effected so far, there have been complaints from the people whose livelihoods 
depended on the land that was taken by the projects. There have been even conflicts 
between the projects’ developers and the local communities affected by the projects as 
the government is caught in between these tensions. Often the main complaints have been 
on what the involuntarily displaced people consider to be lowly or unfair compensation 
by the government or the new investors, and the claim that upon removal from their 
original lands they have had their livelihoods curtailed and have ended up being 
impoverished. 
4.3.4 World Bank Operational Guidelines on Involuntary Resettlement 
The World Bank, which has supported many large projects in different parts of the world 
that have involved involuntary resettlement, acknowledges this concern and had 
formulated operational guidelines to be used in the projects it supports financially or 
otherwise. The guidelines, World Bank Operational Guidelines on Involuntary 
Resettlement were reviewed in 2004. In its introduction to the guidelines, the Bank states, 
‘Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under development projects, if 
unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social, and environmental risks: 
production systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive 
assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their 
productive skills may be less applicable and the competition for resources greater; 
community institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and 
cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are diminished or 
lost’ (World Bank, 2004).  
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 These guidelines (or their predecessor) were not used in the case of the Bulyanhulu mine 
project although the Bank came to be involved in the project. This topic is further 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
Having looked at the institutional and legal framework for mining, I will then examine 
the magnitude of displacement as a result of mining in Tanzania in the next section. 
4.4 Mining and Displacement 
Over 90 per cent of the gold produced in Tanzania before 1998, had come from the areas 
in the vicinity of Lake Victoria (MEM, 2005). The major mining projects of gold, nickel 
and diamond taking place currently are also around the lake basin, and Bulyanhulu, the 
case study area is also located in his area. All of the major mining projects that have been 
established between 1996 and 2005, have involved involuntary eviction of people from 
those areas where mining was to take place. For instance, in the case of Bulyanhulu it is 
estimated that up to 400,000 people were displaced in 1996. My interview with a key 
informant whose organisation is dealing with environmental and human rights, revealed 
that in Geita and Nzega about 30,000 were displaced during 1998-99 evictions in order to 
allow for the establishment of Geita Gold Mine Project and Lusu Golden Pride Project 
respectively. In 2001, at Tarime, at least 10,000 people were rendered homeless in the 
case of Afrika Mashariki Gold Mine, while at Mwabomba, Bukombe, 50,000 people 
were displaced to pave way for gold exploration also in 2001. In Geita, there is another 
planned expansion which may force 30,000 people to resettle elsewhere.  
 
The majority of those displaced and who have not been able to regain meaningful 
livelihoods are bitter and view the discovery of gold and the coming of large-scale 
investors as a curse rather than a blessing. This bitterness and anger has been reflected 
through conflicts that have emerged between the local communities and the large-scale 
mining companies. 
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Figure 4. 3 Bismark Rocks in Lake Victoria. Most of the mining takes place in the Lake Victoria 
Basin. 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006 
 
Is it likely that there could be other displacements, and possibly conflicts as a result, in 
relation to mining activities in Tanzania?  To answer that question let us consider this 
fact.  
 
There is one mining royalty company (Tanzania Royalty Exploration), which as of 
August 2006, held 121 mineral licenses in Tanzania covering more than 10,762 square 
kilometres. All of these holdings are located in and around the world-class Lake Victoria 
Greenstone Belt and Kabanga/Kibara Nickel Belt regions in Tanzania.10 That land owned 
by this company is larger than the whole of Geita district (7,825 square kilometres) or 
Kahama district (8,477 square kilometres). That area held by this firm alone is more than 
62 per cent of the total area of the two districts combined. That area is about a quarter of 
land dedicated to national parks in Tanzania (42, 000 sq.kms)11. Therefore, if it is 
decided that it will be profitable to establish mine projects in those areas held under the 
licences, and that it will be necessary for the people living in those areas to leave, where 
will all those people go to? How are they going to earn their livelihoods? 
                                                
 
 
10 Information at http://amex.com/?ref=/equities/listCmp/EqLCCmpDesc.jsp? Accessed April 16, 2007  
11 According to the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA). 
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 My guess is, unless some steps are taken by the government to plan how to deal with this 
development challenge, then it is likely that there would be conflicts. Indeed, in 1999, 
when the parliamentarians were discussing the Land Act and Village Land Act (both of 
1999), a law professor, Issa Shivji, cautioned the legislators: ‘Any large-scale 
landlessness is likely to create social-strife and instability since the current Tanzanian 
economy is unlikely to absorb people thrown out of land.’12 
 4.5 Displacement and Land Conflicts  
In most of these forced displacements, communities affected have generally complained 
about the process, and most often conflicts between the new investors and the local 
communities have been a result. Some of the conflicts have been violent and resulted in 
human deaths. Some of the incidences have been reported by the media. The following is 
a selection of media headlines reporting about the conflicts or resistance by the local 
mining communities. 
“Mining activities: What is wrong?”, The Guardian, Thursday, July 19, 2001 (editorial).  
“Tarime villagers invade gold mine”, The Guardian, Friday, July 27, 2001;  
“Kahama gold miners resist removal”, Nipashe, Wednesday, August 1, 2001;  
“Small miners say ‘no’ to government order”, The Guardian, Wednesday, August 1, 
2001. 
“Sword of Damocles hangs over Mwabomba small miners”, The Guardian, Saturday, 
October 27, 2001. 
 
I asked the police to provide the statistics on the incidences of land-related conflicts in 
the country over a 10-year period from 1996 through 2006. The statistics (see Appendix 
3) were not readily available and it took them about 10 months to get some figures from 
few districts. The list is not comprehensive enough. For instance, conspicuous by their 
absence are the records about the incidences at Bulyanhulu in Kahama district. According 
to the police report, 35 people lost their lives in incidences related to land conflicts 
recorded in 9 districts during the period. Out of these 35 deaths, six were reported as 
being resulting from conflicts between small-scale miners and large-scale miners over 
mining rights. Other conflicts involved pastoralists and farmers, commercial farmers and 
                                                 
12 Paper presented to the Parliamentary Committee for Finance and Economic Affairs Workshop on the 
Bills for the Land Act and the Village Land Act,  
Dodoma, 26th – 28th January, 1999 
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 villagers, or villagers from adjacent districts or areas fighting over borders. However, it 
can be seen that in Simanjiro district there have been persistent conflicts between small-
scale tanzanite miners and the foreign investor, whereby between 1998 and 2006, at least 
151 incidences were reported, resulting in two deaths, several injuries and loss of 
property. 
 
In most of the conflicts between communities and the large-scale mining companies, the 
bone of contention has been appropriate compensation. Affected communities have 
always insisted that they would leave the areas provided they were duly compensated. 
Some times the government had to intervene to order the mining companies to effect 
compensation (see for example, “Geita Gold Mine ordered to effect compensation” 
(Tanzania Daima, 15 Jan 2007), and Appendix 4 for a similar government intervention). 
However, some of the aggrieved villagers have taken the matter to the courts of law as 
this newspaper article shows: 
 “Some 36 Mwadui Luhumbo residents in Kishapu District in Shinyanga Region have 
filed a dispute with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals against Williamson Diamonds 
Limited (WDL) and New Alamasi (1963) limited (NAL), disputing the procedure used to 
grant the two respondents mining rights over the land they have lived on for over 40 
years…” (This Day, April 13, 2007). 
 
In general, the handling of these conflicts by the government has not been impressive and 
this has exacerbated the complaints. The common view is that government officials have 
tended to side with the investors. The media report below illustrate this point: 
“The government has allowed TanzaniteOne Ltd, a commercial mining firm in Mererani, 
to use reasonable force; including the use of air guns and live bullets against 
underground intruders who trespass the company’s mining area…”  (Guardian, 
December 30, 2006). 
This order, allegedly issued by the Regional Police Commander, was immediately 
challenged by human rights activists.  
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 Another report referred to incidences in which the security guards of a mining company 
were alleged to have killed a villager. The circumstances of the incident remain unclear:  
“Police in Tarime District, Mara Region, have been accused of protecting security 
personnel at a gold mining company in the neighbourhood. The accusations against the 
police were made by Nyangoto villagers following the death of Claver Yohana, 27, a taxi 
driver. According to the villagers, the death was the third in a month, but the culprits 
involved in security skirmishes are left to escape scot-free. On Saturday afternoon, 
hundreds of villagers marched to the gold firm’s premises protesting the shooting 
incident which allegedly killed Yohana…”  (Guardian, June 5, 2006). 
 
Acknowledging the presence of conflicts that appear to be on the increase, Vice-
President, Dr Ali Mohamed Shein, on March 8, 2007, at a conference on peace in Dar es 
Salaam, observed, ‘Conflicts between pastoralists and peasants... between mining 
companies and artisanal miners or between city authorities and street hawkers or petty 
traders are areas of concern.’13  
4.6 Political Ecology and Mining  
This study focuses on involuntary displacement and resettlement of people who earned 
their livelihood at Bulyanhulu at an area that now belongs to Bulyanhulu Gold Mine. 
Some of those displaced were artisanal or small-scale miners, who had discovered the 
gold and worked the reef. These were forcibly evicted to allow large-scale mining. This 
eviction of one group of people from a land-based resource can be looked at from the 
power relations perspective through political ecology. 
 
Historically, gold symbolizes power, might and purity. Traditionally, in most societies, 
gold belonged to the king or chief, or simply the ruling class. The history of mining in 
Tanzania matches this trend. During the pre-colonial period in Tanzania (then 
Tanganyika), ‘…unlike the other minerals which were primarily exploited by Africans, 
gold was exploited on some scale by Arab traders…With the establishment of German 
colonial rule…the recovery of gold and garnet in scattered operations were the principal 
                                                 
13 As reported in the Daily News of March 9, 2007. 
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 mining activities in the early years of colonization undertaken by German diggers’ 
(Chachage, 1993, p. 90). Therefore, gold mining and ownership symbolized the social 
classes and power relations within the society. 
If we look at the small-scale miners and the government of the day, we can also analyze 
power relations with respect to control over resources. For instance, the laws of the 
country stipulate that all land belongs to the state (government). Therefore, one party, the 
government dictates how or when the other party, the miners, could use the land 
resources (in this case gold). The government determines how to allocate the resources. It 
also decides on whom to give and how much. That is a simple definition of politics. 
Ideally, any citizen has the right to use of the land and other resources, including for 
mining, providing rules and regulations are followed. Such rules include acquiring 
permits and licences and paying fees. As I show in Chapter Five, the mining community 
at Bulyanhulu had those rights, of which were taken from them by the state. 
 
 
 
Box 4. 1 Burning Issues’ in the mineral sector in Geita, January 2006 
 
1. People/firms with Prospecting Licences hoarding land without working on 
it and therefore creating shortage of land (may create artificial labour 
oversupply) 
2. Issue of compensation for Katoma residents by Geita Gold Mine 
3. Conflict between small-scale miners and Geita Gold Mine over 
Nyamlilima (Ridge 8) 
4. Conflict between Mgusu villagers and Shanta Exploration/Chipaka Gold 
Mine 
5. Small contribution by Geita Gold Mine to the community around 
 
Source: Report presented to Deputy Minister for Energy and Minerals on 20th January 2006, 
when he toured Geita Mining Office. 
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Gold mining is a global industry and it involves various players in the production and 
consumption chain including International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multinational 
Companies (MNCs). In terms of economic power, which cannot be easily dissociated 
from political power, some of these financial institutions and private companies have 
more power (political and economic) than most governments in the developing countries. 
In the previous section it was shown how the World Bank influenced the formulation of 
policies and laws relating to investment, mining and the environment in Tanzania. The 
Bulyanhulu Mine Project was also supported by the World Bank through its Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  Therefore, it is fair to analyse the displacement 
of thousands of villagers in a remote place in Tanzania from the political economy point 
of view in a globalising world. 
 
As mentioned earlier, until in the early 1990s Tanzania adhered to the centrally planned 
economy under Ujamaa, also called African socialism. Since the adoption of the liberal 
policies under the encouragement of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government appears to side more with the 
private sector. My personal view is that the majority of the Tanzanians are still not 
accustomed to the free market economy; rather they are used to communal or state 
ownership of resources. I argue that some of the current conflicts over resources reflect 
this view. I discuss this issue further in Chapter Seven. 
 
The fact that some communities who were displaced are still fighting for their rights 
through courts of law, and that even others have occasionally deliberately trespassed into 
the mine areas, symbolize some resistance against the new users of the land. And political 
ecology is also about struggles and daily resistance of the people over land resources. 
 
As for the sides involved in the struggle, Blaikie and  Brookfield (1987) say, ‘The state 
commonly tends to lend its power to dominant groups and classes, and thus may 
reinforce the tendency for accumulation by these dominant groups and marginalisation of 
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 the losers, through such actions as taxation, food policy, land tenure policy and the 
allocation of resources’ (p. 17). 
 
In conclusion, this chapter was aimed at providing a broad picture and context to which 
the study is placed. The chapter presented the overview of the mineral sector in Tanzania 
and examined the institutional and legal framework for mining prevailing in the country. 
Despite having laws that appear would protect the minorities, those minorities are not 
protected in practice. As a result, the mining environment is pro-large investors. The 
discussion sought to emphasize the fact that political ecology can be used to analyse the 
displacement of communities in Bulyanhulu that gave way to undertaking a large-scale 
mining development project. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
LIVELIHOODS OF DISPLACEES AT BULYANHULU 
5.1 Introduction 
After looking at the landscape of mining in Tanzania in terms of the legal framework and 
major players, I now turn to the mining community which is the focus of the study. By 
mining community, I refer to the people who lived at Bulyanhulu and whose livelihoods 
were connected in one way or another with mining activity in the area. In this chapter, 
therefore, I describe the study area in some detail and provide the background to the 
eviction process, and then focus on the livelihoods of the people who were displaced. 
5.2 General Description of Bulyanhulu Area 
Bulyanhulu, which is located in Bugarama Ward14, Msalala Division and election 
constituency, Kahama District, Shinyanga Region, basically refers collectively to 7 
villages, namely Bugarama, Busindi, Busulwangili, Buyanje, Ilogi, Igwamanoni and 
Kakola. Prior to the eviction of 1996, Kakola was the main economic and social centre of 
Bulyanhulu and still remained so in 2006. According to the latest population census 
(2002), and the figures which were also available at the Bugarama ward office, the 
population in the ward in 2002 was estimated to be 30,017. The number of households in 
the ward was 6,221, and Kakola alone had almost half of the population (14,044) and 
more than half the number of households in the whole ward (3,510 households). The 
ward office, however, did not have an updated population estimate for the area. 
According to the estimates of one NGO working in the area (called Development and 
Life Relief Association or DELIRA for short), however, the population at Kakola alone 
in 2003 was about 23,000 people. It should also be added that the population in the area 
is very mobile with some people coming to the area to seek for employment or trading 
opportunities and leaving as depending on the success of their mission. There is also a 
high staff turn-over at the mining company and its contractors or suppliers working in the 
area. Nonetheless, the ward executives and other people interviewed were of the view 
                                                 
14 A ward is an administrative area, normally comprising between three and seven villages depending on 
population and population density, economic activities and availability of public and social services. Again, 
three or more wards would make a division, and that system continues upwards to the district and region 
level. 
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 that, despite the seasonal variations, in general the area population in 1996 was higher 
than it was in 2006. 
 
I can describe the area as being a mix of both urban and rural, but more urban than rural 
despite being in a rural area. There is a constant movement of people from different 
places, close and far, into and out of the area. Like most rural areas in Tanzania, the area 
is dusty, among other reasons, because of a lot of vehicular traffic movement on unpaved 
roads. According to my survey, there are probably hundreds of bicycles which are hired 
as taxis on a daily basis. Hundreds of youths (male) provide this important transport 
service in the area cycling for hundreds of kilometres a day. A few people own old, worn- 
out, rickety pick-up vehicles which are used especially to ferry traders and their 
merchandise to and from weekly open markets, gulilo. Donkeys are also used, either with 
carts or without carts, especially when businesspersons have heavy loads and pass 
through village paths over long distances. Small-scale miners prefer donkeys when they 
want to carry “valuable” sand; that is, sand suspected to have some gold residues, for 
further processing or selling. 
 
In general, most people are engaged in the service industry as traders and sellers of goods 
and services ranging from groceries, drug stores and vending water, to small workshops 
and garages and restaurants and guest houses. During the time of the fieldwork, I was 
told there were 23 drug stores and 4 private dispensaries. There was also one government 
dispensary operating.  
 
Agriculture is less important here as people, particularly young men, know that they can 
make quick and perhaps more money by engaging in small-scale mining or trading rather 
than tilling the land. Even when they practice agriculture, it is only to realise capital 
which they can use to invest in small mining or some other business. The main cash crop 
is cotton. Paddy is also grown to some extent to raise money. Like most rural areas in the 
lake zone, most households at Bulyanhulu have livestock of one form or another. 
According to Kahama District Profile (undated), approximately 40 per cent of all 
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 households in the district own cattle, while goats, sheep and poultry are also commonly 
kept. 
 
Bulyanhulu is situated between Kahama and Geita districts’ headquarters, and normally 
the public transport between the two districts uses the main road that passes through the 
villages in Bulyanhulu. The road, however, is dusty as it is not paved, and the journey 
between the two districts can be very challenging. Buses from Kakola centre, for 
instance, take between four and six hours, depending on their condition, to reach either 
district headquarters. Nonetheless, the road is occasionally maintained by both Kahama 
Mining Corporation and Geita Gold Mine, who together with their contractors, actually 
use the road the most to transport their heavy machinery and industrial plants and other 
various supplies in general. It is therefore common to see heavy duty vehicles plying, and 
also either stuck or broken down, somewhere in Bulyanhulu villages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. 1 Most houses at Kakola centre have their roofs kept in place by stones 
 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork 2006 
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Fig. 5. 2 KMCL staff quarters at Ilogi. 
 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006. 
 
How was the general livelihood of people at Bulyanhulu in 2006 compared to the time 
before they were evicted in August 1996? As introduction, I provide a brief background 
to the eviction process in 1996. 
 5.3 Background to the Eviction  
Gold at Bulyanhulu area was discovered by small-scale miners during 1975-76 as a gold 
rush and people started flocking the area from 1976. Within a year of the discovery of 
Bulyanhulu 50,000 people were reported to be working the reef or providing support 
services to miners (Chachage, 1993). The state mining company (STAMICO) working in 
partnership with a Finnish company also moved into the area from 1978 for exploration 
work and restricted small-miners access. While the joint venture collapsed and 
exploratory work was sooner or later abandoned, the small artisanal miners continued 
working upon the area, in a largely unregulated environment and by 1993 there were 
300,000 people operating at gold sites. The area in question had in 1992 been declared by 
the minister responsible for minerals to be an area for small-scale miners and plans had 
been made in 1994 to turn the area into a small township. Kakola, for instance, which is 
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 the main centre for Bulyanhulu, was also formally registered as a village in 1993 (3rd 
September) and was given the certificate of registration No. SHY/KIJ/715.  
 
The conflict started simmering in 1995 when large-scale miners showed interest in the 
area and as it was reported that the area upon which the small-scale miners operated was 
sold to an international “junior” mining company, Sutton Resources of Canada, to 
conduct exploration. Alarmed by these rumours, the miners travelled to the political 
capital (Dodoma) and met the deputy minister for minerals in 1995 (30th April) who 
assured them that the miners would not be evicted. As it turned out, the promises were 
given for political reasons that being an election year, as the miners had vowed to vote 
for the opposition parties should they be removed from the area by force. The small-scale 
miners were forcefully evicted from the area in August 1996 by the police and 
paramilitary forces against legal procedures and while the issue regarding their legality of 
working the area was still in High Court. This involuntary displacement affected 
thousands of people at Bulyanhulu who earned their livelihoods from activities that 
centred on gold mining. There are claims that at least 50 people were buried alive during 
the eviction and demolition process. Despite lingering questions, the government has 
never officially addressed these allegations. Some observers suggest that the government 
has even attempted to intimidate those who raised the claims, including human rights 
activists and politicians. 
 
The area is now owned by (or was leased to) a Canadian company, Barrick Gold, trading 
under the name of Kahama Mining Corporation Limited (KMCL). While the use of force 
by the state paved the way for KMCL to take over the area, interviews supported by 
documentary evidence also show that the company was actually licenced to mine at 
Butobela area, which is in a neighbouring district of Geita, and not at Bulyanhulu, which 
is in Kahama district (according to Prospecting Licence PL 216/94 issued to KMCL on 
the 6th September 1994). It is also on record that Sutton Resources and Barrick Gold are 
associated, the former being a subsidiary of the later. 
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 Given this background and outstanding controversies, this chapter focuses on the 
livelihoods of the people who were affected by the displacement. It seeks to understand 
the lives of the people in the aftermath of such a development and is based upon stories 
told by the affected people, interviews by other key informants and supplementary 
documentary sources.  
5.4 Impoverishment Risks  
Research is increasingly showing that contrary to the expectations, development 
programmes that are supposed to widely improve living standards have also brought, 
under the wings of progress, the forced displacement of millions and millions of poor and 
vulnerable people in many of the world’s developing countries, inducing impoverishment 
and hardships (Cernea and McDowell, 2000). According to Pettersson (2002, p.115), ‘In 
addition to the eviction itself, victims of development-induced displacement often have 
their rights violated afterwards. Many are left landless and destitute.’ 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Cernea and McDowell (Ibid.) have identified the 
following risks associated with development-induced displacement: homelessness, 
landlessness, joblessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property assets, 
marginalisation, community disarticulation, and increased morbidity and mortality.  
 
In the following section I look at some of these elements in the livelihoods of the 
displaced communities and show whether or not the eviction led to impoverishment. 
Morbidity and mortality data were not accessible and those risk elements are not 
discussed here. 
5.4.1 Homelessness 
The definition of who is ‘homeless’ is not straightforward. Is it simply the question of 
being without a place in which to live? Is it the lack of a house or absence of shelter in 
the technical sense? Does it refer to people living on the street? What about people living 
with friends or relatives because they cannot afford own accommodation? Or is it also 
about the standard of housing and living conditions, socially and economically? That is 
why some researchers would rather talk of a ‘continuum of homelessness’ in order to 
capture each of the many elements of homelessness. For its part, the United Nations 
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 defines a ‘homeless’ person not only as someone without a domicile who lives on the 
street or in a shelter, but equally be without access to shelter meeting the basic criteria 
considered essential for health and human social development (UNCHS, 1996). 
 
A more recent proposal by other scholars (Springer, 2000) advocates for a replacement of 
‘homeless’ with ‘houseless’. In my study, I will use this ‘new’ definition and will cover 
people who had houses before the eviction but now reside with relatives or friends. 
 
Most of the houses at Kakola, the main centre for Bulyanhulu, can be described as 
shanties. In explanation of such poor housing condition, respondents gave two reasons; 
one, that the mining company (KMCL) has banned all development activities in the area, 
including new construction or renovation of buildings; and two, the owners said they 
feared that  they would forcefully be removed from the area any time. They, therefore, 
considered themselves being on transit, on the move, and would rather live in “temporary 
shelters” than risk investing in decent housing.  Most houses had roofing sheets fixed in 
place by mere stones so that the owners could quickly remove the sheets and salvage 
them should they be required to leave the area on short notice. 
 
According to the respondents, the mining company was collaborating with the district 
authorities to discourage the people from continuing living there, and one way of doing 
that was limiting availability of public services to the local community. They gave as an 
example the fact that the power supply company has refused to supply electricity to the 
houses of individuals arguing that the area belonged to the mining company. I was given 
a copy of the letter from the state-owned power supply company (TANESCO) as proof to 
their argument. 
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Fig. 5. 3 Newly constructed market complex at Bugarama. 
 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006 
 
Two other examples were given to show deliberate efforts by the company to force the 
community members leave their homes and hence leave the area. First, the main road 
coming to Kakola centre was diverted so that it passes away from the centre, and second, 
the market also constructed away from the centre. The community, however, has 
“boycotted” the newly constructed market and it was not in use during the time of 
research. It has remained a white elephant in an isolated place. 
 
According to the informants, houses at Kakola centre were not demolished during the 
eviction process because the area did not have operational mining pits. This was a trading 
and also residential area. Houses were demolished in other areas around Kakola, where 
actual mining took place, or people lived as villagers and farmed, such as Bariadi, Namba 
Mbili and Stamico. According to the village and small miners’ leadership, more than 
3,220 houses were demolished in four vitongojis (sub-villages). This forced some people 
from the villages that were razed to move to Kakola (from the periphery to the centre, an 
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 in-migration, some sort of internal displacement) and lived with people they knew from 
before. 
 
According to the informants, several people who had their houses demolished during the 
eviction process had to live in tiny all-grass huts because they could not afford to build 
even the equivalent of the houses they had before. Some of the interviewees said 
following the eviction and house demolition, they had to be sheltered by their relatives 
and some still lived in the houses that belonged to those relatives as they were struggling 
to survive themselves, and also because they were waiting to know the fate of their 
compensation to be determined by the court. 
 
In general, however, while all of the affected people I talked to had a house they lived in, 
whether their own or belonging to the relatives, all claimed that their housing conditions 
were of lower quality compared to the time before the eviction. They primarily described 
the quality in terms of size of house, and stated that they now lived in smaller houses 
because they did not have sufficient resources to build the houses they wanted. Those 
informants were hesitant to invest in housing due to a fear of future eviction. Those who 
lived with relatives, some were simply not comfortable to live in houses not belonging to 
them. As one respondent put it, “Yes, I live in a house, but that is not my home; I am not 
at home.”  Such living conditions can be summarized by the saying “A house is not a 
home.” 
 
Through my interviews, I was told that only 58 families, out of thousands of families and 
households, were compensated. Forty-six families came from an area called Namba 
Mbili, and 12 were from Bariadi. The monetary compensation ranged from TZS 10,000 
(at the exchange rate of TZS 560 to 1 Dollar, this was about USD 18) to TZS 400,000 
(about USD 714). There were also 14 families which lived at Namba Tisa area that had 
their huts demolished by the mining company but were offered new huts, built by the 
company’s money, of same size and quality (constructed with poles, mud and thatch), at 
another place. The families, however, refused to move in saying they deserved better 
houses.  
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The question of housing discussed above seems to be in line with what Cernea and 
McDowell (Ibid.) wrote: 
‘Experience shows that resettlers, even if compensated, may not be able to build again their houses 
to the same level. They may end up living in “temporary” shelters. This often makes homelessness 
chronic rather than temporary. At the Foum-Gleita irrigation project in Mauritania, only 200 out of 
the 881 displaced families successfully reconstructed their housing; the rest lived precariously for 
two years or longer in tents or under tarpaulins. In the Kukadi-Krishna irrigation subprojects in 
Maharashtra, India, 50 percent of the displaced families were found living in temporary or semi-
permanent houses 10 to 15 years after their relocation’ (pp. 25-26). 
 
Box 5.1 summarizes a story of Mabula Limbe (61), who is one of the affected people. 
 
Box 5. 1 The story of Mabula Limbe 
Mabula Limbe was 61 years old in 2006. He had lived at Bulyanhulu since 1981. He and 57 others 
represented their colleagues to challenge the notice to vacate the area without a fair compensation 
through the court of law. His house, however, was demolished while he was in Dar es Salaam following 
up the case in the Tanzanian Court of Appeal.  
 
Ten years after the demolition he has not been able to build another house. He is now sheltered at a 
relative’s house while struggling to build his own house. In 1996 he had two houses, one which he 
describes as big and modern, with corrugated iron sheets, and another as small with thatched roof. 
 
His family had 19 members but now has disaggregated because of lack of space as they were forced to 
move and leave with other relatives. He now lives with 11 of his family members at a relative’s place, 
and three of his children cannot go to school anymore for lack of the necessary resources.  
 
Before the eviction, Limbe had 60 acres of land, on 15 of which he grew cassava. He also had 46 cows, 
52 goats and 3 dogs. Two years after the eviction in 1998 he was given TZS 239,505 (about USD 428 at 
the current rate). In order to get by, he has been selling his livestock, one after another and now has 
none left. He tries to get some money through selling firewood and metal scraps. The scraps are not 
easy to find and sometimes the firewood is not sold in which case he returns home empty-handed and 
sleeps on an empty stomach. Sometimes friends lend him some little money. He has been living with 
chronic tuberculosis for 10 years and has been able to survive through use of local herbs. 
 
He occasionally meets some of his old neighbours and most of them barely survive in the same way as 
he does. Since the eviction, however, the network is broken down. 
 
After a long day of moving around the villages observing and meeting some of the victims, I offered 
Limbe and those who were accompanying us some lunch in a restaurant. He ordered ugali (the staple 
food in the area and in Tanzania in general) with beef. He ate enthusiastically and, perhaps, a bit too 
fast. We also ordered our meals. Everybody also had a drink. When we were finished, Limbe thanked 
me at length, and almost with tears in his eyes. Among other things, he said: 
 
“My son, today you have made me eat beef. I had forgotten this. I have never eaten like this in a long 
time. You have bought me soda water (he drank two bottles). I used to eat meat whenever I wanted. I 
could just slaughter a goat whenever I wanted. Now I can’t do that…I am used to just passing the day 
without a meal…God will bless you my son… 
58 
 5.4.2 Landlessness 
In this section, I cover the issue of landlessness among the evictees. Landlessness here is 
used to refer to a situation in which a person or the whole community do not have the 
quantity of land of the quality that they would otherwise need for their normal economic 
and social development.  
 
The area that was taken over by the mining company during the 1996 eviction was that 
where there were mining pits operated by the small-scale miners. When it was put under 
the control of the company, the area was fenced off. The company claimed that it was 
only doing some exploration work. Some people continued to access the area that was not 
fenced off for their different livelihood endeavours. During 1997/98 local authorities in 
collaboration with the mining company renewed the process, which had actually been 
initiated in 1994, of developing a land use plan that would make Bulyanhulu a small 
township. However, the company sought to expand its perimeter during that interval. 
Through the use of the government structures, people were notified to leave the areas still 
accessible after the eviction of 1996. Those with crops in the fields were given time to 
harvest them. As a result, more people, were virtually declared as ‘invaders’ and lost their 
land to the company.  
 
The people I interviewed on the question of access and ownership to land claimed that 
they were negatively affected by the eviction process. This is not surprising especially 
considering that there was no compensation in form of land. Those who had mining pits 
before the eviction now had none. The few farmers who were compensated received little 
money, and certainly an amount insufficient for acquisition of an equivalent piece of 
land. Experience from other countries seems to match this observation. Cernea and 
McDowell (Ibid.) say ‘A sociological study of Kenya’s Kiambere Hydropower project 
found that farmers’ average land holdings after resettlement dropped from 13 to 6 
hectares; their livestock was reduced by more than one-third, yields per hectare decreased 
by 68 percent for maize and 75 percent for beans…’ (p. 23). 
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 According to Bugarama village chairperson, three-quarter of the village land was taken 
over by the new investor, and this alone reduced agriculture land by half. The Bugarama 
Ward Executive Officer also told me that land under cultivation has decreased 
considerably and the area in general has become a net importer of food supplies.  
 
Maize is the staple food in the area and a 20-litre tin of maize normally sells at between 
TZS 5,000 and 6,000 (USD 9-11) and this is considered to be expensive to the majority 
of people. Other common food types include rice, cassava, potatoes, millet, beans, 
groundnuts and simsim. 
 
All the interviewees stated that they were now less assured of their food supplies because 
fewer people engaged in farming anymore as land had become scarcer.  Farmers also 
cited insecurity about land access as a reason for decreased food production. 
 
During the interviews with the project affected people, it was apparent that those who 
were mostly doing farming before the eviction were more concerned about access to land 
and were quick to point to land scarcity than those who had been involved in mining per 
se. 
 
Another category of people who claimed that there was not sufficient land to engage in 
agriculture were young people who rode bicycles for hire. Most of them told me they 
opted to run the bicycle “taxis” as there was no land for them to engage in agriculture. 
Most of the operators, however, had come from far away from the neighbouring districts 
to Bulyanhulu which was the centre of economic opportunities. This also implies that 
land scarcity is a problem that goes beyond Bulyanhulu and its neighbouring areas and 
districts including Meatu, Maswa and Geita. 
 
What can be discerned from the above is that there is a real problem of land shortage in 
general at Bulyanhulu as well as in the adjacent areas. The displacement of people to 
allow for the large-scale mining did not help matters and rather exacerbated landlessness. 
Most of the areas onto which the current villages sit belong to the mining company. 
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 Kakola centre itself, although it was never demolished, is said to be lying within the 
mining area. 
 
One of the common pleas from the respondents was that the company should allow them 
to utilise the land which it was not currently using, and the use of which land would not 
interfere with the mining processes. The respondents said their request has been turned 
down by the mining firm. 
 
Box 5.2 below summarises the story of Charles Fuli (48) who was also affected by the 
eviction process. 
 
Box 5. 2 The story of Charles Fuli 
 
Charles Fuli is 48 years old and by 1996 he had lived in the area for 20 years. He came to the area from 
another district, Sengerema. His family has 14 members and three of his children go to primary school. 
 
He was a farmer and had 30 acres onto which he cultivated maize, rice and cotton. In addition, he had 27 
cows, 10 goats, 5 sheep and 70 chickens. Now he does not own any land, and he is forced to rent land of 
which he pays after selling some of his produce. He now rents only 1 acre on which he gets his food. He is 
concerned that there is not sufficient land and most people are merely squatting on other people’s land. 
 
 
Before the displacement, he lived at Namba Mbili; now he lives at Lwabagikulu. On the day of the eviction 
he had to erect a shelter within hours in which he (and his family) spent the night. He was, however, able to 
build a house one year later, in 1997. The previous house was much bigger and better, he says. 
 
 
During the eviction, he was given three months to be able to harvest all his crops from the field. He had 
much food crops in the field and he had to sell all the food quickly. He did not sell his cattle then. Because 
of bad weather this year (in 2006), he was forced to sell eight of his goats in order to get money for food. 
 
Because of the displacement that took place he lost most of his friends and contacts, but has now made new 
friends. 
 
He says the valuation and compensation process was not fair because there was no consultation. He also 
says the crops were not considered as worth; only houses were valuated. He says some people were paid as 
lowly as TZS 6,000 (USD 11) which they refused to accept. 
 
 
 5.4.3 Joblessness 
In this study, I describe joblessness to mean not having a job, being out of work, idle, 
unemployed, or not engaged in a gainful occupation. 
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Before the events of 1996, small-scale mining employed, directly, thousands of people in 
the area. Data gathered from the leadership of the miners association said, for instance, 
over 1,809 individuals owned mining pits. It should also be noted that some of these 
owners had more than one pit at a time. On average, each owner had three pits. 
Production on each pit involved four to six workers at a time, in one labour shift. It can 
be estimated, therefore, in one shift it was possible to find a total of 32,400 small-scale 
miners working the pits. In a 24-hour busy day, almost 100,000 miners would have 
worked. It is clear that the eviction and closure of mining activities by small-scale miners 
have resulted in increased joblessness in the area. 
 
Following the eviction some of the miners moved to other areas continuing their search 
for gold. Some of the areas where these miners went include Busulwangili and 
Nyangalata in Kahama district, and Nyakabwe, Nyamalapa and Nyang’omango in Geita 
district. However, this number is small because most of the potential areas are now 
owned by large-scale mining and exploration companies. Furthermore, small-scale 
mining operations have become almost illegal in the area around Bulyanhulu and often 
these miners are threatened with arrests on claims that they were encroaching on Kahama 
Mining Corporation’s property. Harassment by the firm’s security guards has also 
removed the potential for jobs in the neighbouring areas. 
 
Kahama Mining Corporation has employed about 1,700 people. The company is free to 
employ anyone from anywhere, including from overseas, provided they meet 
qualifications. According to the Chairperson of the Small-Scale Miners, between 40 and 
50 of the miners who were displaced secured employment with the mining company. The 
company out sources most of its services from primarily non-local suppliers and 
contractors most of whom are not local. This diminishes further any possibilities of 
employment among the local population. 
 
According to the informants, there were fewer people now who were engaged in different 
economic activities compared to the period up to 1996. Various business outlets had been 
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 closed down, they told me. The remaining business outlets were mainly in the service 
industry including retail shops, tailoring, restaurants (food stalls), food and charcoal or 
firewood vending. Bicycles still remain the main source of transport in the area and 
scores of young men provide this service on hire. The minimum fare per trip is TZS 200 
(USD 40 cents). The income of a taxi cyclist in a day ranges from TZS 2,000 to 4,000, 
according to my survey among the cyclists. One of the cyclists, a young man in his early 
20s, who identified himself as Musa, told me that amount was sufficient for his family 
upkeep. Another cyclist whom I once hired claimed that during the era of small-scale 
miners there were more passengers and earning were six or more times higher compared 
to the time of my research. His view was shared by many other cyclists I happened to 
probe in my unstructured interviews whenever they rode me around. 
 
All of the people I interviewed, however, said that in general the overall volume of trade 
has gone down compared to before the eviction. Bugarama Ward Executive Officer 
confirmed that the money collected as levies from the various businesses had decreased 
since the eviction as there were fewer businesses operating. Youths were a group that was 
affected the most by unemployment as a result of the closure of small-scale mining 
activities. 
 
To summarize, most of the people who were evicted and the general population at 
Bulyanhulu are literally jobless. There are limited employment opportunities from the 
new large mining investment. Some young men occasionally get temporary employment 
when there is a construction project in the mine, but this does not happen as frequently as 
they would wish. My respondents told me that for lack of customers and capital, most 
small businesses have also closed down. For those interested in agriculture, farming land 
has also become even scarcer. A combination of all these factors have generally made 
most people, young and old, become an idle lot.  
 
The situation at Bulyanhulu following the establishment of large-scale mining resembles 
what Cernea and McDowell (Ibid.) described as being a result of a development project 
in Madagascar.  
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 ‘In the Madagascar Tana Plain project in 1993, for example, those displaced who operated private 
small enterprises-workshops, food stalls, artisan units-were not entitled to compensation and lost 
their place of business and their customers… 
 
‘Joblessness among resettlers often surfaces after a time delay, rather than immediately, because in 
the short run resettlers may receive employment in project-related jobs. Such employment, 
however, is short-lived and not sustainable. Evidence compiled from several dam projects shows 
that the “employment boom” created by new construction temporarily absorbs some resettlers, but 
severely drops toward the end of the project. This compounds the incidence of chronic or 
temporary joblessness among the displaced (p. 24-25). 
5.4.4 Loss of Access to Common Property 
In the context of this study, common property refers to natural or land-based resources 
owned and used communally. Such include water sources and graze land. 
 
According to respondents, at least the people at Kakola lost two main common 
properties, namely fresh water well and grazing land. The deep well, previously supplied 
water for about 30,000 people. The population is now dependent upon shallow wells 
whose supply is not reliable. These wells typically result in long waits for water. On the 
other hand, the company has developed another water source by tapping water from Lake 
Victoria. However, this piped water is sold to the villagers at TZS 25 (USD 4 cents) per 
20-litre volume. Respondents claimed that many people cannot afford the cost and they 
question the rationale of them buying water from a “rich investor”. The company has 
allowed one village which is closest to the water intake to use the water free of charge 
and task the village with protecting the pipeline from sabotage by the villagers that do not 
benefit. 
 
The issue of losing good quality water sources also came up during Focus Group 
Discussions where participants were very bitter with the mining company, which they 
claimed went against its promise of improving social services including safe water. They 
were also worried that continued fencing off of land would deprive their livestock of 
pasture land. 
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 Some interviewees mentioned other lost common properties including the cattle dip and 
graveyards for both Christians and Muslims. They said now the whole ward does not a 
have a dip for the livestock, nor the areas for graveyards, areas which were taken over by 
the mining company. 
 
5.5 Survival and Coping Strategies 
After the eviction in 1996, some members of the mining community left to different 
places to continue their livelihoods and others stayed. By mining community I refer to the 
different people who were in the area doing different things as part of their livelihoods. In 
general, however, it is clear that the number of those that left was higher than which 
remained in the area. For instance, while it is estimated that there were over 400,000 
people during the eviction in 1996, by 2006 when I visited the area, the figure of the 
population given was between 14,000 and 23,000 people. All the people I interviewed, 
including some local leaders, confirmed that the population in the area was much less 
than it was before. A controversial Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which was 
commissioned by Kahama Mining Corporation after the closure and eviction of small-
scale miners produced an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which stated that the 
population at Kakola in April 1997 was only 986 people (KMCL, 1997). I will later 
(Chapter Seven) discuss this issue of EIA in detail. 
 
In the next section, I focus on those people who were affected by the eviction but 
remained in the area, either as a matter of necessity or by choice, and try to understand 
how they are surviving and how they have been able to cope with the eviction ever since. 
I look at these people on the basis of a broad category what they were doing for their 
living. 
 
5.5.1 Small-scale miners 
Digging in Open pits 
Since the closure of the mining pits in 1996, some of the small-scale miners shifted their 
ventures to other nearby places searching for gold in open pits, while maintaining links 
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 with the former mining area and networks. The main area where most of these miners are 
now eking out their living from is Nyangalata. Mining activity, however, is at a relatively 
even smaller-scale because of fear of the mining company which claims to own the area 
used by the small-scale miners. The miners normally go to these mining sites, spend few 
days working there and come back to their villages. Sometimes they are chased away by 
the mining firm’s guards. 
 
Scavenging 
Other small-scale miners have resorted to scavenge on tailings (waste left after gold ore 
has been extracted from rock), which have been processed by the KMCL and thrown 
away. When they get this sand or boulders they perform re-processing and if lucky, they 
may get some small gold nuggets, though of inferior quality, which they then sell to 
‘middlemen’. Middlemen are gold businesspeople with some connections to other gold 
traders and goldsmiths outside the village and have relatively large capital. 
 
Accessing these deposits is not without its problems, however. While in the past people 
could freely collect the left-over, the company has since decided against this policy and 
now it is ‘illegal’ for the locals to go near the piles of tailings which are within a live 
electric enclosure. 
 
River panning 
A number of small-scale miners who were evicted from the pits have now decided to 
continue their mining by panning from the river beds and some wetlands. These miners 
are especially concentrated on the downward side of the company’s mining pile-ups and 
from their experience, the run-off from those piles do contain some gold particles (or 
dust) which flow into the rivers and streams around. I was told the number of this type of 
miners increases considerably during the rain season. Because of the physical demands of 
the process normally people work in teams of four. 
 
Box 5.3 tells a story of three young men who work as a team. 
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 Box 5. 3 Story of a Mboka team 
 
 
To be able to complete gold recovery process, water is used to wash the sand away. Sieving is done using a 
structure called mboka. Anybody with their tailings can rent the mboka to sieve and recover gold particles.  
There are also sand/rock crushers which have to be used to grind the tailings before they can be washed and 
sieved through the mboka. The minimum unit for a crusher if five pans (karai) the volume of each being 
about 5 litres. 
 
Tabu Busu (41) came from Bariadi district to Bulyanhulu in 1985 and started working in mining pits until 
in 1996 when the miners were evicted. In 1998, he established an open pit along a small stream so that he 
could use the running water to wash and sieve his ores. Since 2000, he has been working with two other 
colleagues, Pamba Samba (40) and Mapinduzi Sumuni (25). The latter arrived in Bulyanhulu in 1996 
coming from a nearby district of Meatu. 
 
Unlike in the past, this mboka team is now finding the going tough as the ores they dig, crush and sieve do 
not have any gold in them. Previously, a three-day work could have earned them at least TZS 20,000 (USD 
35), but these days they would be lucky if they could get TZS 2,000 (less than USD 4).  Samba says before 
the eviction he used to earn at least TZS 10,000 (USD 17) per day. 
 
“Formerly, we would just dig the top soil and take it for crushing; but now even the water flowing in this 
stream does not have any gold. In dry season it is even more challenging,” Busu says. 
 
Busu has two wives and 6 children, three of whom attend primary school. Samba is married (one wife) with 
three children and all go to school, while Sumuni has a family with two children (still infants). 
 
On leaving or taking other options, I could summarize and paraphrase what they say:  
“We can’t leave now because we don’t have enough money for fare and to take home with us and establish 
ourselves anew there. Some of our colleagues who left had some money.  
“We are more connected with the people here now. 
“We don’t have any land for farming and are just used to searching for gold.” 
 
So, this Mboka team has opted to stay and continue their search for gold despite being occasionally 
harassed by the mining company and the gold yield decreasing. They are surviving on a hope that one day 
things will be alright. 
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Fig. 5. 4 Crusher at crushing site. The material is brought to site by donkeys. 
 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. 5 Small-scale miners at work. Photo shows river panning at its best. 
 
Source: Wanzala, P.N. Fieldwork, 2006 
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 5.5.2 Farmers 
Whereas miners lost their employment opportunities, farmers lost the land and the 
opportunity to work on the land as well. Most of the farmers who were directly affected 
by the displacement reported not to have their own land anymore. At most, they rent few 
acres (less land than they had before) from other people to continue their farming 
activity. The rent was TZS 10,000 (USD 17) per acre per growing season. Another way 
of paying for rent is through farm produce where a certain amount of the produce is taken 
by the land owner. Therefore, one way of coping for these farmers is to continue farming 
but on less acreage of land (downsizing).  
 
Selling some of the property is a coping strategy that was used by some of the farmers. A 
farmer, Charles Fuli, for example, was in 2006 forced to sell 8 goats in order to get some 
money to buy food. Majaliwa Biye, who was both a farmer and a pit owner, had to sell 
some of the domestic items and appliances, one item after another, in order to raise some 
money for daily use. Following the mining closure, Biye had to cope living off farming 
alone. Furthermore, since the mining company has restricted growing of long-term crops, 
such as cotton or cassava, Biye and some of his colleagues have resorted to growing 
short-term crops, in particular potatoes. This can be described as a diversification within 
agriculture. 
 
Mabula Limbe (61), who used to be a farmer, said he did not have any land after the 
eviction and was too old and sickly to engage in agriculture anymore. He, therefore, 
opted to involve himself in collecting and selling metal scraps and firewood as a means to 
get some income. 
 
At least one respondent, however, Minza Mwanakabadi (66), a widow, was mainly 
depending on assistance from other members of the community. She was given a piece of 
land on which to grow potatoes. She said she was too old to pursue other options, such as 
digging for gold along the rivers. She also said she never receives any assistance from her 
only daughter who is married and lives in the regional headquarters, in Shinyanga town. 
Before the eviction, Mwanakabadi and her husband did not own livestock and had only 3 
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 acres of farm land. This shows that a small portion of the population can cope and 
survive on direct or indirect assistance. 
5.5.3 Business persons/Pit owners 
Before the eviction of 1996, some members of the community were simply 
businesspeople. Some of them owned pits, while others ran other business operations 
including guest houses, restaurants and general merchandise shops. In the aftermath of 
the eviction, some of these businesses closed down, for various reasons, according to my 
informants. For instance, some entrepreneurs left the area altogether, while some ran 
bankrupt. I was told, during my interviews, of people who had wanted to commit suicide 
because they had borrowed money from banks or individuals and were worried that after 
the eviction they would not be able to repay the loans, and that they would remain poor 
forever. 
 
Meanwhile, some pit owners found new pits in nearby areas, and yet others resorted to 
farming. Some told me they had to change their lifestyle (adjustment); for instance, 
instead of living only with own family in the house, they rented out part of the house to 
other people in order to raise some money and supplement family income. That means, 
different people responded to the situation differently in a bid to survive and cope with 
the shock depending on the assets that they had before the eviction. 
 
Some pit owners, like Heri Saasita (aged mid-40s), who had 3 pits, have become gold 
dealers, meaning they buy small quantities from individual small-scale miners and resell 
the gold for a profit. During the time of this study, the dealers bought 1 gm of gold at 
TZS 15,000 (USD 27). Saasita stated that he had two houses before the demolition and 
only one was in the area that faced demolition, so now he lives in this other house.  
 
Other businesspersons affected by the eviction and whom I interviewed included Maalim 
Mmanga Kadau, Emmanuel Bombeda and Faustin Nagagwa Luzama. All were 
influential members of the community. Kadau is the chairperson of the small-scale 
miners and has been in the forefront in the on-going case against the company and the 
government. Bombeda is a member of the village executive council, while Luzama (80) 
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 is the commanding chair of the highly feared and respected traditional vigilante group, 
Sungusungu. The former two have also become dealers after losing their pits during the 
eviction and demolition process. In addition, Bombeda runs a small shop from his home 
at Kakola centre, which helps him survive. 
 
Another businessperson of interest is Bahati John Kanyungu who had lived at Bulyanhulu 
since 1984, having migrated there from Mwanza city. He was a transporter and also ran a 
shop. He stated that the eviction made him lose business in terms of people who would 
hire his vehicles and sales volume in his shop have relatively gone down. He attributed 
this to the decrease in purchasing power of the members of the community in general. For 
him, the change was to learn to live with less money. Kanungu was the village chairman 
during my fieldwork.  
 
Having looked at some of the elements of livelihoods of the affected members of the 
community since their displacement, as well as their survival and coping strategy, in the 
next section, I discuss further the question of impoverishment as a result of the eviction. 
5.6 Discussion  
In my fieldwork at Bulyanhulu (Kakola and surrounding villages), I conducted in-depth 
interviews with 11 people, a focus group discussion with 12 participants, and 
unstructured interviews with at least 8 people. Respondents in all these interviews 
included men and women, the young, middle-aged and the old. Of all these, only one 
person, who happened to be the village chair, thought that while income poverty has 
increased as a result of the eviction, there was more sanity and social order than before. 
Otherwise, all other respondents were bitter and categorical that the displacement had 
impoverished them.  
 
Examination of the elements which relate to livelihoods of a community that have been 
highlighted above, such as a home, a piece of land, and a job to do, shows that most 
people ended up with fewer of those elements, in quantity and/or quality. In other words, 
they were at risk of becoming poor if not poorer. These livelihoods elements have a 
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 relation with income poverty. A person without land (or means to access the same) or a 
gainful job, is most likely to have less disposable income.  
 
Comparing the income situation in the community before 1996 with that in 2006, Kadau 
said, “Nowadays you cannot find one person buying another person soda water; people 
are really broke,” and added, “Look around, people cannot even buy a pack of biscuits, 
biscuits are sold in pieces because nobody can buy a whole pack.” 
 
That until 1996 most people had much more income to spend and even had conspicuous 
consumption was supported by Luzama, who said it was common to find people, 
especially small-scale miners, spending up to TZS 200,000 (USD 357) per day on a 
drinking spree. The beer industry (some of the beer was being imported from Kenya) is 
said to have reported much lower sales in the region following the closure of mining. It 
should be noted that sales of beer play an important role on nation economy considering 
that one major beer company alone contributes 10 per cent of government revenue in paid 
taxes.  
 
The fact that incomes of this mining community decreased as a result of curtailed 
livelihoods is even supported by the Environmental Impact Statement published by the 
mining company in 1997 as a result of the Environmental Impact Assessment. The 
statement acknowledged that small-scale mining at Bulyanhulu once offered rural people 
an income about 6 times what they could make from farming. Furthermore, it stated, 
‘Although it was difficult to estimate the income of the people in the areas covered by 
this study, it was possible to establish that their income before the closure of small-scale 
mining was higher than now (July 1997). The average income of the people in the study 
area was highest in the Shinyanga region (KMCL, 1997, § 5.4.3. 5). 
 
On Section 8.1.3 the report also noted, ‘Artisanal mining activities had the positive effect 
on local households of providing additional income earning opportunities, increasing 
disposable income and the number of income generators, and improving services such as 
transportation and shops… The closure of small-scale mining had a major negative effect 
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 on economic activity, population and social development, which has been felt beyond the 
immediate mining area’ (Ibid.). 
 
Similarly, Cernea and McDowell (2000, p.24) note in their study of a displacement in 
Kenya that family income dropped by 82 per cent. 
 
It is therefore fair to conclude that, as it has happened elsewhere in similar experiences, 
the incomes of the majority of people in Bulyanhulu area who were directly and 
indirectly affected by the closure of small-scale mining in the area went down. Other 
important elements in their livelihoods were also negatively affected. In general, the 
displacement of this mining community increased the risk of impoverishment of the 
members of the community in both non-income and income terms. 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
STAKEHOLDERS’ ROLE AND INFLUENCE ON DISPLACEMENT OUTCOME 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a Kiswahili phrase which goes that ‘The one with the knife is the one who will 
eat the steak’. This means it does not matter so much whether, and for how long, one 
holds a piece of steak; what matters the most is having a sharp knife to chop the steak.  
 
The Kiswahili phrase cited above can relate to other interests. For the people displaced at 
Bulyanhulu, their steak was the gold, the farms, the land, their livelihood. However, other 
people, whom I call stakeholders or social actors, or simply actors, were also interested in 
those same resources. 
 
In this chapter, I seek to explore the role and influence of the different actors or 
stakeholders on the eviction process from the time before it took place through the 
current period. I first identify the key actors and who had an interest in the area, and then 
analyse their roles and influence on the results that have come to bear. By the end of the 
chapter, it will be clear who held the stake (and steak) and who had the knife. 
6.2 Stakeholder Analysis  
At a glance, one notices three major actors in the issue of displacement at Bulyanhulu, 
namely the Government, the Mining Community comprising the small-scale miners and 
the villagers in general; and the Investor, that is Kahama Mining Corporation Limited 
(KMCL). I have, however, identified other actors, by no means less important. I will 
describe them below and show their roles and influence. 
 
Government is broad entity and can be broken down into smaller units such as the 
executive branch, parliament and the judiciary. There are even two levels of government: 
central government, and local government. Central government refers mainly to the 
cabinet and ministries, while the local government means government level from the 
region, the district down to the village. 
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 There are two primary investors who were directly or indirectly connected with the 
events at Bulyanhulu. These are namely Sutton Resources and Barrick Gold. These 
companies are public licenced companies with shares traded in Canada, United States and 
United Kingdom, and hence owned by shareholders in different parts of the world. Sutton 
Resources sold its stocks, worth USD 280m, to Barrick Gold which trades as Kahama 
Mining Corporation Limited (KMCL) as far as the Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Project is 
concerned. According to its own estimates at the time of commencement, Barrick 
anticipated to get USD 3bn over the 15-year period projected to be the life of the mine. 
Meanwhile, Tanzania expects to earn only USD 75m in taxes and revenues. It is 
noteworthy to mention the World Bank here since it also got involved in the project by 
providing some political risk guarantee (through MIGA) worth USD 172m. This amount 
is said to be the largest insurance offered by MIGA/ World Bank Group to a single 
commercial project. 
 
The mining community comprised the people who actually owned the pits, miners who 
were employed to work the pits, villagers who lived in the surrounding area as farmers or 
herders, and different entrepreneurs whose activities were ancillary to the mining 
business. These included transporters and vehicle workshops (garages), restaurants and 
food stalls, water vendors and general stores. As mentioned earlier, during the eviction, 
this group was estimated to consist of about 400,000 people. In the previous section I 
showed how small-scale miners, farmers and businesspeople, who were the core part of 
the mining community at Bulyanhulu, were affected by the displacement. 
 
Beyond this glance, however, one can appreciate the presence and influence of other 
players, sometimes acting behind the scenes. I have identified such others to include 
consultants who conducted the assessment and advised whether the large-scale mining 
project was to be allowed to proceed and what mitigative measures were to be taken. 
Others are the financiers of the project, politicians, civil society organisations, and the 
media. 
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 6.3 Stakeholder Role on Process and Outcome  
In the section below, I look more critically at each of the main actors and their role on 
and outcome of displacement. 
6.3.1 Government  
As a democracy, the government has three administrative arms namely the executive 
(state), parliament (legislature) and the judiciary (courts of law). The executive branch 
has the responsibility of enforcing various legislations and maintaining law and order. 
The legislations (different laws) are enacted by parliament, while the judiciary has the 
responsibility of interpreting those laws. 
 
In Chapter Four, different laws and policies relevant to the study were explained. 
According to law, all land in the republic is public and hence technically speaking 
belongs to the president who is the head of government and who can decide on its 
ultimate access and use. The laws, however, are clear on the process that should be 
followed by the state before it can offer to, or take from, a person or a group of people, 
land for whatever use. 
 
As far as Bulyanhulu displacement is concerned, the process was not followed. For 
instance, there was no clear notification and negotiation process on the relocation as 
stipulated by law. Instead, the state first declared the small-scale miners who worked in 
the area as illegal miners and trespassers and therefore ordered them to vacate within a 
month. The miners went to court to get an injunction to allow them remain in the area 
until the matter was resolved. They won and the court ordered the state to stop 
implementing its order until the issue was resolved in the court. However, the state did 
not obey the court order and moved its organs, including the police force, to forcefully 
evict the miners and demolish several houses and fill the pits. Following the forced 
removals, the Inspector General of Police issued a press release denying the allegations of 
killings but admitting that about 200,000 Bulyanhulu residents had been evicted from the 
area in the course of about one week. 
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 According to the Committee representing the small-scale miners, out of over 3,220 
households in the area that were demolished, only 26 families of livestock keepers 
seemed to be satisfied with the compensation they received and left the area accordingly. 
This should not be surprising because most pastoralists in Tanzania in general tend to 
lead a nomadic life, moving their cattle from one place to another. In relative terms, 
normally they do not invest so much in housing or farms in the area they live; they are 
more or less people on the move. For the pastoralist, leaving the area was not as painful 
as for other members of the community. To them, the most important resource is grazing 
land. Since it was possible to move their cattle to other areas in search of pastureland, it 
was alright as long as and considering that they were given some money to use on the 
way or establish themselves in the new area they would find. 
 
However, there were 58 families of other residents who were either farmers (as opposed 
to livestock keepers) or businesspeople, including those who owned the mining pits or 
who worked as small-scale miners, who were compensated, but were not satisfied with 
the amount of compensation. These are still hanging on at Bulyanhulu and they 
challenged in the courts of law the amount of compensation arguing that it was neither 
commensurate nor fair. The minimum compensation offered to a family was about USD 
10 while the maximum was USD 400. The case has been going on since 1998.  
 
The role of the executive arm of the government (the state) in this case was, therefore, 
taking land from the miners and villagers without due process and making most of them 
landless, homeless, unemployed, and food insecure among others, and hence increasing 
their risks of impoverishment. In addition, the state, in the name of investment, gave this 
land to another group of people; large-scale miners. 
 
Some words should be said here on the position of the local government in order to 
understand its role. On the one hand, the local government seems to be independent of 
the central government, but on the other it is clearly under the central government. The 
political leaders of the local government, from the village up to the district council, 
including members of parliament and the chairperson of the council, are elected by the 
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 people. The district councils, however, can be dissolved by the minister responsible for 
local governments. At the same time, the head of the district, known as District 
Commissioner, is appointed by the president. It should also be stated that the issues of 
minerals and mining rights have been given much importance to the extent that they are 
administered directly by the ministry responsible for minerals. In short, major decisions 
are made at the level of the central government. Given the absence of any evidence that 
individuals or leaders within the local government were actively involved, it is fair to 
suggest that the local government played an insignificant role in shaping the outcome of 
the events that happened at Bulyanhulu. 
 
The parliament as a whole did not intervene to castigate this interference of justice by the 
state. However, occasionally individual members of parliament raised concern over the 
way small-scale miners were evicted and the fact that most of them were rarely 
compensated. 
 
For its part, the judiciary is still playing its role of interpreting legislations through the 
court. The matter is now at the highest court level in the country, the Court of Appeal. 
According to the evictees, all their hopes on the issue now are pinned on the court. 
6.3.2 Large-Scale Investor 
Kahama Mining Corporation Limited (KMCL) publicly (or officially) entered the 
Bulyanhulu scene in early 1999, after its parent company based in Toronto, Canada, 
Barrick Gold Corporation, bought the mining rights from Sutton Resources, a mining 
exploration company headquartered in Vancouver, Canada. As KMCL entered, Sutton 
Resources left the scene. Indeed, KMCL has at times argued that it was not there (at the 
place) during the eviction and displacement because the area then belonged to Sutton 
Resources and should not be held responsible for what transpired then. As indicated in 
Chapter Five, KMCL had been licenced to carry out their operations in another 
neighbouring area, Butobela, since 1994. However, upon acquisition of Bulyanhulu, 
KMCL stopped its work at Butobela. 
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 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that KMCL’s date of entry into the area and its role 
before, during and after the eviction of small-scale miners is unclear. In its 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) following the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) conducted in 1997, KMCL claims that it secured the licence for the area in 1992. 
The report reads: 
 “…KMCL obtained an exploration license in 1992 following conclusion of an 
agreement between Sutton Resources and the Tanzanian Government whereby the 
Government retained a 15% interest in the project.15  The stoppage of small-scale 
mining took place peacefully under the direction of government representatives in 
August 1996” (KMCL, 1997, § 5.1). 
 
The last sentence in the quotation above, that the closure and eviction was peaceful 
appears to be an explicit misrepresentation. That the eviction was violent was even 
reported in the government-owned media. My interviews with various sources including 
those from the Ministry of Minerals, non-governmental organisations (LEAT and 
DELIRA), local leaders and the people (miners, farmers, businesspersons) at Bulyanhulu 
confirmed that the eviction was indeed brutal and lives were lost in the process.  
 
Despite government’s earlier denial, after apparent some pressure from various sources, 
the Minister for Home Affairs, Hon. Mohamed Seif Khatib (as he then was) released a 
press statement on September 17, 2001 that stated that about 11 people died in the course 
of the evictions (LEAT, 2003). However, Minister Khatib attributed those deaths to mob 
justice or natural causes. This late admission by the government that some people did 
actually die in the course of the evictions should have necessitated an official inquest in 
the Coroner’s Court to determine the manner and the cause of the deaths and whether any 
criminal acts were involved. The fact that this was never done raises questions as to the 
assumption or feelings that the government was hiding some facts from its public and 
indeed that people did die during the eviction. 
 
The need for a thorough investigation in such cases is also enshrined in the United 
Nations instruments, to which Tanzania is a signatory. According to the United Nations 
                                                 
15 The Business Times of June 25, 1999, reported that, for unspecified reasons, the government had reduced 
its shares from 15 to 5%. Later the government gave up all its shares 
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 Principles on Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions recommended by the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Resolution16, member states are required to carry out ‘thorough, prompt and impartial 
investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions 
including cases were complaints by relatives and all other reliable reports that suggests 
unnatural deaths in the above circumstances.’ 
 
Another example to show the unpleasant role of the company in the episode is the 
changing of the estimate of the population of the mining community in the area. For 
instance, when Barrick Gold/KMCL submitted its project proposal to MIGA, the 
Government of Tanzania and Canada’s Export Development Corporation, the population 
estimate of the mining community at Bulyanhulu was repeatedly a maximum of 400,000. 
LEAT (Ibid.) quotes these documents as writing “…the discovery of the Bulyanhulu gold 
deposits in 1975 attracted some small-scale artisanal miners to the site… and by 1993 
there was a massive influx in which some 30,000 to 400,000 artisanal miners, associated 
entrepreneurs and ‘opportunists’ arrived.” However, following complaints over the 
manner of the eviction and allegations of killings, Barrick Gold/KMCL lowered the 
number of people who were in the area at the time of the eviction to 15,000. 
 
When KMCL was challenged in court over the issue of compensation, in its defence the 
company submitted documents that showed the total compensation paid by the company 
amounted to slightly over USD 4,000 (LEAT, Ibid.). By any standard, this amount is very 
low. Assuming that each of the 400,000 people estimated to be there during the eviction 
was to be compensated, then each person would get USD 1 cent! And if, for sake of 
argument, there were only 4,000 people that deserved to be paid, then each would receive 
a compensation of USD 1 for all their property including houses, agricultural crops and 
as disturbance allowance before they were evicted.  
 
Some evidence, according to the Chairperson of Small-Scale Miners at Bulyanhulu, 
showed that Mr James Sinclair, then Chairman for Sutton Resources, had advised his 
                                                 
16 This is stated in UN Resolution No. 1989/65 of May 24, 1989. 
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 Board to authorize USD 3m for the compensation. The amount was rejected by the Board 
for reasons that remain unknown. 
 
It is noteworthy that despite the take over of the area and subsequent establishment of the 
mine, the relations between the mine company and the community were initially cordial, 
but started turning sour from 1999, according to the residents. As mentioned earlier, in 
1998 the company, the community and the District Council were all involved in drawing 
plans for making the area a small township. The community contributed TZS 2m/- (USD 
1,600) towards the exercise which was later curtailed. From July 1999, the company 
prevented members of the community from either farming in the area or using a water 
borehole for their water supplies. The investors are also accused of going against their 
promises which included supplying the community with potable water. When the 
villagers requested access to the unused land, which was under the company control, the 
investors responded that the community should ask the government to lower the tax on 
the unused land because the company pays for the land though it does not use it.  
 
The villagers considered other moves by the company as simply meant to harass and 
eventually force the community from the area. These included diverting the road from the 
Kakola centre as well as establishing a market away from the town. Villagers were also 
wary of the decision by the mine company to pay its staff the salary using banks that are 
outside the district arguing that the move kills their businesses because the employees 
tend to purchase all their needs after they draw their salary in those districts hence 
denying the local businesses a market. Initially, the company paid its staff the salary at 
the mine and local traders told me that they made good business as a result.  
 
The company also prevented the villagers from scavenging waste materials from various 
construction works at the mine site. The villagers claim that this was done in order to 
discourage them from living in the area. Those residents with houses which used to be 
rented out by the mine staff were also not happy with the fact that the company had built 
its own staff houses which meant that they lost their potential tenants. A few staff still 
rent houses at Kakola centre, but the company, I was told, plans to build more houses so 
that all the staff would live in staff houses and not with the local community. 
82 
  
The community was bitter with these changes and blamed the investors that decisions 
were made in bad faith and that they were aimed to strangle community livelihood, and 
lead to he appearance of voluntary exodus of the area. The villagers believed that if the 
company succeeded in removing them from the area voluntarily then it would not be 
required to compensate them. On the other hand, the residents have vowed to remain until 
they are compensated. Some even said they should not be blamed if they plotted sabotage 
schemes against the investor’s property. 
 
While a contentious relationship exists between, the investors and the community, in 
general, the investor enjoys the support of the government from the district level high up 
to the central government. 
6.3.4 Mining Community 
As explained previously, the mining community comprised small-scale miners, farmers 
and businesspeople working and living in the area. To a large extent, and with the 
exception of well-established and settled farmers, the community was constantly in flux, 
with people coming and going depending on their economic and social success. Through 
my interviews, I came to realise that most of the community members at Bulyanhulu who 
were there during the evictions and those who have remained todate were mainly 
economic migrants from other districts and regions of Tanzania. It is also true that there 
were people from neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. It seems 
that most of the original residents had left the area after the gold rush. There are similar 
experiences in the country where the local people tend to sell land to new-comers at more 
than the normal local price and go elsewhere to continue their livelihoods and establish 
themselves afresh. 
 
This nature of the community composition could explain why, for instance, after the 
forced eviction most members of the community left the area. Most of those who have 
remained either maintain large investments contingent on pending court cases or are too 
impoverished to go elsewhere to found new life. 
  
83 
 It should also be noted that most of the miners, did not migrate to Bulyanhulu with their 
families and lived in simple, temporary ramshackle huts, not proper houses per se. The 
housing structures were akin to the shelters seen in most refugee camps in western 
Tanzania. To the majority of the miners and traders, Bulyanhulu was a workplace not a 
living place. People went there with an objective to make quick money and go back to 
their places of origin and invest in other ventures. That is why out of over 3,220 families 
whose houses were demolished, only a few (58 families) are still following the matter in 
courts of law to get what they consider as fair compensation. Others gave up and simply 
left the area soon after the eviction. As for pit owners, 900 claimants only remain out of 
over 10,000 members (miners and pit owners) registered with the local small-scale 
miners committee, who continue to seek legal justice in the courts. The pit owners sought 
compensation for their lost and buried mining tools and equipment. Some of the pit 
owners are also the same people whose houses were demolished. At the time of the 
research, a total of 1,940 claimants lost both mining pits and houses and were never paid 
anything. 
 
The mining community was a heterogeneous mix of individuals with different 
backgrounds and economic aspirations. Members of the community had different levels 
of wealth and resources when the eviction occurred and responded differently depending 
on how they were immediately affected. It is these different responses that have 
contributed to the outcome of displacement as obtaining during the time of research. 
6.3.5 Civil Society Organisations 
Civil society can be defined as that realm which falls neither on government nor on the 
private sector. Civil society organisations therefore include professional and specific 
interest and advocacy groups not affiliated to any political parties. They are organisations 
run to advocate a certain social cause and do not seek to make and share profits or 
dividends like commercial companies do. Such groups have been loosely and collectively 
called non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
 
My investigation showed that the only civil society organisation that was active in the 
area before, during and after the eviction is the “Small-Scale Gold Miners’ Committee,” 
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 which was established and registered in 1993. Members of the Committee were able to 
meet the Deputy Minister responsible for minerals in February 1995 to try and convince 
the government that the small-scale miners should not be evicted as rumours had already 
circulated that the mining area had been sold to a foreign investor and the miners would 
be evicted. The miners were promised the right to stay and continue their work providing 
they obey the law (Minutes of 30th April 1995 meeting held at CCM Headquarters, 
Dodoma). However, two weeks after the meeting, the Deputy Minister issued a press 
statement refuting that the miners had been allowed to continue working in the disputed 
area. 
 
According to the Chairperson of the artisanal miners, during the general election 
campaigns of 1995, when the ruling party sensed that most of the would-be voters in the 
area were against the party, the ruling party officials had to request the committee to 
convince the miners, who had vowed to vote for the opposition should they be removed, 
to vote for the ruling party. For once, the miners’ committee was a powerful force that 
had to be ‘requested’ by the ruling party campaign team. 
 
Similar situations occurred during the 2005 general elections at the Mererani tanzanite 
mining area where the small-scale miners have also been challenging the right of the 
foreign large-scale investor to mine the gemstones. Like at Bulyanhulu, the small-scale 
miners at Mererani were removed from the area under controversial circumstances. Most 
of the miners were reportedly against the ruling party and the ruling party presidential 
aspirant had to promise the miners that the government would not forcibly remove the 
small-scale miners. 
 
The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Tanzania (LEAT) took an interest in the Bulyanhulu 
case in 2001 following the media publicity of the forceful evictions and has been 
representing the project affected people in court. Since LEAT’s follow up the matter 
received much more publicity across the world, including in Canada and the United 
States, and the human and environmental rights advocacy group sought intervention from 
the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) for MIGA and the International Finance 
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 Corporation (IFC) but to no avail. Because of the Bulyanhulu case, LEAT officials have 
had troubles with the police, who among other things, charged the former with sedition. 
The case has been dragging in court since 2002. 
 
At the time of the research, there were two other organisations working in the 
community, CARE and DELIRA. CARE is an international development non-
governmental organisation, and it started its education programme in the area in 2001, 
with the support from the mining company (KMCL). School-age children of the mine 
staff as well as those from the community in general are benefiting from the education 
programme, whose officials claim that it has helped stem child miners. DELIRA, which 
stands for “Development and Life Relief Association,” started working in the area since 
2003. At the time of the research, its main focus was on environmental conservation and 
promoting income-generating activities for youths. According to DELIRA official, the 
main challenge facing the organisation was the sustainability of its projects given the fact 
that members of the community were not ‘settled’ as they feared that they could be 
forcefully evicted from the area anytime. In this way, the organisation’s projects were 
only half-heartedly received by those expected to benefit. The official gave an example 
saying, ‘Although we provide the people with free tree seedlings, not many are willing to 
take any to go and tend them because they are not sure whether they would still be living 
in the area the following day.’ 
 
With LEAT, it is clear that the work of the organisation has influenced the outcome of 
the eviction in the sense that most of the evictees who remained are legally assisted by 
the organisation. My research showed that most of the project affected people would stay 
in the area at least until their matter is resolved in the courts of law where they are 
represented by LEAT. Unlike LEAT, however, it is difficult to show whether and how 
CARE and DELIRA have so far influenced the outcome of the eviction. 
6.3.6 Politicians 
Tanzania is a relatively young multiparty democracy. It is common to find politicians 
from the ruling party supporting the government even where they know they should be 
against a particular government decision, while the politicians from the opposition parties 
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 would, almost, be against the government, sometimes, unnecessarily so. However, most 
of the time also, politicians such as members of parliament (MPs), would tend to support 
their constituencies even when they (MPs) may appear opposed to the government. And 
when an issue or motion is tabled before the parliament, most often the government 
would have its way despite some resistance from members of the opposition and few 
members from the ruling party. As far as the Bulyanhulu displacement is concerned, the 
role of politicians on the whole issue was inaction until the eviction took place. With the 
exception of the late Bhiku Mohamed Salehe, a former Member of Parliament for 
Msalala constituent (in which Bulyanhulu is located), who raised the issue in the National 
Assembly during the parliament session in July 1996, most politicians were mute on the 
topic. However, as the issue of allegations of the killings of miners persisted, some key 
leaders from the opposition parties also joined the fray. These included the chairmen of 
political parties, John Cheyo of the United Democratic Party (UDP), and Augustine 
Mrema of the NCCR-Mageuzi. Both accused the government of improper conduct over 
the allegations. The latter was later charged with sedition over some documents linked to 
alleged killings of artisanal miners, together with two leaders of LEAT, the human rights 
advocacy organisation which has been representing the evicted miners in the court. The 
case has been going on since 2002. If the prosecution wins the case, the accused could be 
jailed for up to two years in prison. Since the charges were brought up against the 
lawyers and the politician, other politicians have refrained from public comment on the 
Bulyanhulu evictions. 
6.3.7 International Financial Institutions and  Donor Governments 
In the era of globalisation, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) which include the 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and large, wealthy nations that 
advise and financially support developing countries, exert a profound influence on the 
lives of people within those developing countries, for both good and bad. Their influence 
comes, through technical advice on policy and operational matters of governments. It also 
comes through financial support given to those developing countries directly to their 
budgets of specific development programmes and projects. These financial institutions 
and donor countries provide loans and grants, and may decide to cancel the debts owed 
by the indebted countries. Tanzania, for example, whose development budget is 
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 contributed by donor countries by over 40 per cent, is among the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) and has been greatly influenced by the financial institutions and donor 
countries. 
 
As a background, from the mid-80s, Tanzania has been unable to resist the influence and 
even pressure from the financial institutions and the donor countries under the so-called 
Paris Club. Consequently, began to implement the infamous Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), which were advocated by the IMF. Breaking from the hitherto 
centrally planned and mainly socialist economy, Tanzania adopted free-market economy 
and liberalisation policies, which included liberalisation of the minerals sector. The 
World Bank played an influential role in the formulation of Tanzania Mineral Policy of 
1997 and the subsequent Mining Act, 1998. According to Paula Butler in Campbell (ed.) 
(2004), the World Bank initiated in 1993-94, a five-year Mineral Sector Technical 
Assistance Project for Tanzania to ‘introduce a legal, regulatory and fiscal framework, 
which would provide an environment conducive to private investment in mining… Most 
notably, the project included assistance in rewriting relevant national legislation, e.g. the 
new Investment Act of 1997 and a new Mining Act of 1998, to harmonise Tanzania’s 
legislation with the requirements of the new global political economy’ (p.68). It is 
therefore not surprising that the mining legislation in Tanzania has attracted international 
mining giants, such as Barrick Gold, within a short time, most of whom started their 
mining operations in the country from 1999. 
 
As far as the Bulyanhulu case is concerned, in 2000 the World Bank Group, through 
MIGA, offered Barrick Gold political risk insurance worth USD 172m. Under this 
agreement, the World Bank would pay that amount should the project be disrupted by 
any politically related cause or civil upheavals. It was likely important for the investors, 
Barrick Gold, to get such an insurance considering that the people who were evicted were 
bitter and could come back and cause unrest. However, LEAT (2003) notes that MIGA 
did not conduct any due diligence on the overall project and investigate any violations, 
before it agreed to offer them the insurance as it should have been the case. Following the 
claims on forced and violent evictions, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) for 
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 MIGA was forced to conduct an investigation into the alleged violence and killings 
during the eviction. The final verdict of the Ombudsman was that the allegations could 
not be substantiated. In conflict with other reports, the Ombudsman report claimed that 
the number of evicted people was between 200 and 2000, a figure which is much lower 
than that given by the company itself. 
 
The official at the World Bank whom I interviewed about my research was uneasy and 
unwilling to dwell or discuss the role of the Bank on the events of Bulyanhulu. The 
official, however, acknowledged the important role played by the artisanal miners and the 
challenges facing them and revealed that the Bank in Tanzania was in the process of 
formulating a five-year (2007-2011) USD 50m project called “Sustainable Management 
of Mineral Resources in Tanzania” aimed at, among other things, getting small-scale 
miners more organised. 
 
As for donor governments, in the case of Bulyanhulu there were reports that the Canadian 
government threw its weight behind the Canadian investor to ensure the acquisition of the 
mining area by whatever means necessary (LEAT, 2003). There are even reports 
suggesting that Canada suspended its financial support to Tanzania because the second-
phase president of Tanzania (1985-1995), Ali Hassan Mwinyi, had opposed the Canadian 
acquisition of Bulyanhulu and expulsion of small-scale miners; and that the third-phase 
president, Benjamin William Mkapa, was told in no uncertain terms that the resumption 
of aid was dependent on his acting to remove artisanal miners from Bulyanhulu.17 
 
Related to the issue of donor governments is the fact that sometimes, retired but globally 
influential governments’ leaders hold positions in the companies in question. For 
instance, within Barrick, at least until 2001, the advisory board was chaired by former 
Canadian premier, Brian Mulroney, while other members included former US president, 
                                                 
17 An article titled A Golden Example of Globalization: Bulyanhulu, the World Bank and the Kinder, 
Gentler President, by Bradburn-Ruster, Michael, March 20, 2003. See also 
http://www.leat.or.tz/about/pr/2002.01.09.national.post.php 
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 George Bush, Sr.; former US ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young; and a close 
associate of former US president Bill Clinton, Vernon Jordan. Such respected members 
of the board could easily, if they so wished, influence decisions to be taken by leaders of 
the developing countries, including those of Tanzania. According to Michael Bradburn-
Razer18, ‘in May 2001, Barrick President and CEO Randall Oliphant, who was fired in 
February 2003, told shareholders that the Tanzanian government had been sanguine about 
Barrick’s takeover because of the company’s stellar advisory board.’ 
6.3.8 Consultants 
Consultants were involved in the project during the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and the subsequent writing of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This 
process took place during 1997-1998, before Barrick started its operations in 1999. 
Ideally, a negative EIA report would imply the project should not be allowed to continue. 
Indeed, there have been claims of instances where consultants drafted reports showing 
the projects would not have negative impacts on the environment and communities 
around them against common sense and despite obvious indications pointing to the 
contrary. In these circumstances, one can say, the professionals are influenced by project 
owners to produce an EIS in favour of the investors. At the same time, there have been 
instances where despite negative reports by (ethical) consultants, projects had been 
allowed to go on by politicians. My interview with an official with the National 
Environment Management Council (NEMC), which is responsible for overseeing such 
environmental impacts assessments, confirmed these experiences and possibilities. 
 
As for Bulyanhulu Mine Project, the EIS contained some arguments or statements which 
appear to play down any negative comments regarding the impact of the eviction on the 
mining community. For instance, while it was clear that the eviction in 1996 was 
forceful, violent and controversial, in its concluding remarks, the EIS (KMCL, 1998) 
states that, ‘There is currently no apparent conflict between KMCL and customary land 
holders in the area. There also appears to be low potential for conflict.  Ensuring access to 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
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 resources in the area not in conflict with mining operations will maintain this potential at 
a low level’ (§ 11.1.5). 
 
In my reading of the above quotation, however, the last sentence at least admits the 
possibility of conflict when it advises that local community should have some entry into 
the area to access resources (land, water sources) providing such access does not interfere 
with mining operations.   
 
On impact of project on land use pattern, the report says, ‘Some 50 square kilometres of 
agricultural land and potential agricultural land is infringed upon within the current 
KMCL PL area.  However, only a relatively small population exists in this area and will 
be affected by development of the Project’ (§ 8.3.1). This is another example of direct 
misrepresentation. Assuming the statement to be correct, negates the possibility that some 
people may not live in the area in question but still maintain their farms in the area. This 
is common in rural Tanzania where people may even walk 10 kilometres or more daily, 
to and from their farms, and especially so, following establishment of villages where 
some people found themselves located far away from their original farmlands. Therefore, 
the issue should not have been whether people existed in the agricultural area, but rather 
whether the area in question was being used or had the potential of being used by the 
members of the community. 
 
The EIS also made some promises that the investor, KMCL, would undertake in 
improving the lives of the surrounding community. These were in areas of social services 
such as health, education, and water supply. According to my interviews, respondents 
were not pleased with what has been done to date by the investor. They even claimed that 
they had worse water supply now that the investor took from them their main water 
source, a deep, fresh water well. In short, during my research in the area, the people 
articulated a sense of mistrust, anger and animosity towards the mining company. 
 
However, the fact that the EIS was accepted by government authorities meant that the 
project could go ahead. What can be said now is that the Environmental Impact 
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 Statement which was prepared by the Consultants, paid by the investor, to some extent 
presented a picture that influenced the outcome of the eviction. 
6.3.9 Media 
Media coverage on the fate of small-scale miners of Bulyanhulu started from 1995 
following the meeting between the Deputy Minister for Water, Energy and Minerals as 
the ministry was called then and the committee of the miners. The media reported the 
government allowing the small-scale miners to continue their activities at Bulyanhulu, 
and a week later the same media reported the government refuting that it had allowed the 
miners to stay.  
Media outlets also reported the government ordering out the miners in July 1996, a few 
weeks before the eviction took place. On July 31st 1996, Daily News carried a title 
"Government orders out Bulyanhulu miners". After the eviction had taken place some 
newspapers also followed the event. A Kiswahili daily, Majira (12th August 1996) 
reported “Kufuatia amri ya kuwatimua wachimbaji wadogo: Watu 23 wahofiwa 
kufunikwa na 'greda' Bulyanhulu" - which can be translated “Following the order to evict 
artisanal miners: 23 feared buried alive by bulldozers at Bulyanhulu”. The following 
day, another daily, Mtanzania, wrote: “Utata Watawala Maafa ya Kahama: Waliokufa 
machimboni wahofiwa kufikia 52: Picha za maiti zapelekwa Dodoma, wadaiwa 
kufunikwa na magreda" – which translates to “Controversy reigns over Kahama mine 
tragedy: Death toll feared to reach 52. Photos of the victims sent to Dodoma. Victims 
allegedly buried by bulldozers”. Dodoma is where the Parliament sits and the 
photographs were taken to show members of parliament.  
The media also reported stories from people who survived during the incident. For 
instance, on August 30th 1996, Majira reported: "Aliyenusurika kufukiwa Bulyanhulu 
ataja waliokufa: Adai wenzake wanne wamekufa" (A survivor names the dead: Claims 
four colleagues are dead). And on September 9th 1996, The Guardian published a feature 
article "The day hell broke loose at Bulyanhulu" which described the event on account of 
witnesses. Furthermore, newspapers published items indicating how the police were 
thwarting efforts of small-scale miners to excavate their dead colleagues from the buried 
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 mine shafts. It took over a month before government authorities refuted the media 
reports. Majira quoted Shinyanga Regional Commissioner, Maj. Gen. (rtd.) Tumainieli 
Kiwelu, as he then was, as saying those who claimed that some people were buried alive 
were “liars and fabricators”. The story, on September 17th 1996, was under the headline 
“Hakuna waliofukiwa mashimoni Bulyanhulu - Kiwelu”, which can read as “Nobody 
buried in the mine pits - Kiwelu”. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the media tried its best to report about 
the fate of small-scale miners before they were evicted, immediately after the eviction 
and some time afterwards. Most of the Tanzanian public were informed about the 
eviction through the media. Other actors, including non-governmental organisations such 
as LEAT referred to above, took an interest in the issue following such media reports. 
The world came to know of the episode after it was reported first in the local media. To 
what extent did the media reports shape the outcome of the eviction? It is difficult to 
answer this question with certainty, other than accepting the fact that what we do is 
influenced by what we know and come to know from and through various sources and 
outlets including such media. However, I hold the view that while the media contributed 
in exerting pressure on the government to come out clean on this forceful displacement of 
thousands of people, there were other more powerful global forces that rendered the 
media coverage on the plight of mining community relatively inconsequential. 
6.4 Discussion 
Having detailed how the different actors participated in the process from the pre-eviction 
stage through the post-eviction period, it is worthwhile to discuss further the outcome and 
how it came to prevail. 
 
Using the political ecology perspective, I look at the events leading to the eviction, the 
eviction itself, life after the eviction, and the relationships among the different 
stakeholders as struggles in which each stakeholder promotes and protects their interests, 
values, knowledge and power. From the perspective of the displaced, theirs is a resistance 
against the powers that be, the investors and the government of the day. Was, or has, this 
resistance been successful? 
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Based on experience from different projects worldwide, McDowell (1996) argues that for 
a resistance to be successful, a number of factors need to be operating simultaneously. 
‘These include the fact that the local campaign of resistance has to be effective and with 
strong international backing. Also the government has to demonstrate willingness to 
listen to the concerns of the protestors. And if the World Bank is involved, an influential 
sector within the organisation has to be opposed to the project and against the plans of the 
borrowing government’ (1996, p. 117). 
 
In the case of Bulyanhulu, the ‘local resistance’ was, at best, very local. There is no 
evidence to indicate that other regional or national civil society organisations were 
involved in the campaign. The “Small-Scale Gold Miners’ Committee” was fighting a 
lone fight. LEAT started its assistance only in 2001. International media such as the 
Canadian National Post, or interest groups such as Canadian-based Council of Canadians 
and MiningWatch, also became involved, at least 5 years after the eviction had taken 
place. 
 
The outcome of the Bulyanhulu ‘local resistance’ can also be explained by the nature of 
the members of the mining community and especially the members of the “Small-Scale 
Gold Miners”. It is a fact that most of the members of this community were economic 
migrants who went to the area to ‘try their luck’ as gold and gemstones mining is 
normally believed to be in Tanzania. Therefore, on being evicted, most of the members 
apparently resigned to themselves saying ‘it was not their luck’ and quickly packed and 
left the area. The resistance weakened. It should also be remembered that this widely 
heterogeneous community comprised members from different parts of Tanzania and 
indeed neighbouring countries.  
 
According to McDowell (Ibid., p. 83), ‘a successful record in defending local interests, 
usually based on a long history of internal coherence and solidarity, effective political 
structure, leadership and previously existing community organisations which may 
backstop resistance movement, may also affect the community’s ability to mount and 
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 ultimately institutionalise serious resistance efforts.’ This description fits well the 
situation of Bulyanhulu. 
 
Another challenge that seems to have affected the Bulyanhulu resistance is economic 
resources. According to the Chairperson of the Miners’ Committee, raising funds to get 
their court case going has been a principle constraint. The High Court that dealt with their 
cause was located hundreds of miles away and only few members could travel to attend 
the case. One such member is Mzee Lujiga (cited in Chapter Five), who travelled by 
bicycle for hundreds of kilometres, from Bulyanhulu to Tabora, spending nights on the 
way in the villages, to attend the proceedings.  
 
Economic factors have also been noted by McDowell (Ibid.) who says that economically, 
resistance requires the mobilisation and expenditure of labour and other resources in 
novel ways, diverting time and energy from other important tasks and stressing 
communities that may already be pressured to meet normal needs. 
 
The Chairperson also divulged to me that approximately 40 members of the mining 
community, who are employed by the mining company, have been assisting the 
Committee financially but secretly for fear of reprisals from the management, probably 
sacking,  if it were known that they are ‘assisting the enemy’. 
 
On the question of government attitude towards the demands of protesters, the experience 
at Bulyanhulu in 1996 is simply that the government refused to hear the cry of the mining 
community. At the meeting in 1995, between the deputy minister (responsible for 
minerals) and the representatives of the miners, the government promised to allow the 
small-scale miners to continue eking out their living. However, the government did not 
make good its promise. Indeed, the government did not even listen to itself as the state, 
which is one arm of government, executed the eviction against the order of the High 
Court, which is another branch of the same government. 
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 It can be added that the struggle between the government (and the investor behind the 
scene) and the mining community, was a power struggle. And in line with Max Weber, 
power ‘is manifested when an actor within a relationship is in the position to carry out 
their own will despite resistance’ (Ibid., p. 182). Indeed, the government carried out its 
own will despite the resistance from the mining community that continues today. The 
current and daily struggle, however, closely pits the investor against the mining 
community who now tensely co-exist. 
 
The World Bank came to be involved in this project through its risk guarantee in 2000 
while the eviction took place in 1996. However, I have found no suggestion that any 
faction within the Bank was opposed to the project despite the fact that the Bank in 
Tanzania would have known of the eviction. Being among the major multilateral 
financiers of Tanzania, there are instances when the Bank has intervened, advising the 
Tanzania government on certain decisions. Indeed, the Bank has occasionally expressed 
its displeasure at the government’s performance and record including in relation to the 
observation of human rights. In Bulyanhulu case, however, the World Bank was rather 
silent. The same can be said of the donor countries represented in Tanzania, who might 
have criticised the government for human rights abuse; if they said anything then their 
voice was unheard. 
 
To summarize, in this chapter, I have outlined the different social actors and how their 
actions, or inactions, contributed to the outcome of the displacement. The main actors 
were the government, foreign investors and the mining community that was affected by 
the displacement. Through the details and discussion, it is evident that the displacement 
can be described as a power struggle as well as a struggle over distribution of resources. 
In this struggle, while the mining community was less organised, the government and the 
investors were more powerful and enjoyed overt or covert support from external actors. 
These indirect actors included the International Financial Institutions and the donor 
community at large. This is the essence of globalisation in which the lives of people in 
rural remote areas of developing countries such as Tanzania are influenced and affected 
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 by the capital and decisions of multinational companies, some of which are by 
themselves, more influential than governments.  
 
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, some people may hold big chunks of steak but 
may lack sharp knives to chop and enjoy the steak. From the foregoing, it is clear that the 
majority of the mining community at Bulyanhulu fall in this unfortunate example. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMERGING ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNT 
7.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I have shown what transpired at Bulyanhulu in 1996, and the 
current livelihoods of the mining community who were evicted and prevented from 
continuing their mining in the area that now belongs to Kahama Mining Corporation. The 
company is owned by the global mining giant, Barrick Gold. In this chapter I set to 
review and discuss some of the emerging issues and lessons thereof. But first, I make 
some comparisons with what happened in other development-induced displacements in 
the country. 
7.2 Experience from other Development-Induced Displacement in Tanzania  
Tanzania has seen a number of development-induced displacements over the period of its 
existence as a nation. Undoubtedly, the largest single displacement in terms of the 
number of people involved, was the Ujamaa Villagisation Programme (Operesheni Vijiji) 
of the 1970s, which according to some estimates, about 12 million rural dwellers were 
forcibly resettled in villages or hamlets (Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 1996). Some observers, 
including Kaijage and Tibaijuka (Ibid.), have been critical of the villagisation 
displacement process and conduct. Citing other sources such as Hyden, 1980; Mc Henry, 
1979; and Freyhold, 1979, in their UN-commissioned study, they argue that a number of 
studies have documented evidence which proves, beyond doubt, that, in most of the 
country, the outstanding feature of Operation Vijiji was that district and village 
authorities implemented it with a great deal of arbitrariness and injustice. In short, the 
exercise was conducted without negotiation or consultation, nor was there compensation 
to the affected people. However, the opinion of the people on the impact of the 
villagisation displacement is divided, with some people in the villages still attributing the 
poverty they have today, mentioning land scarcity and lack of better houses, to the 
villagisation programme of the 1970s. Others, the majority, argue that the villagisation 
programme helped bring the people together, building social cohesion, and increased 
security in its broad sense. 
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 At different times, between 1970 and 2007, for example, the government has 
implemented various development projects, especially those relating to infrastructure, 
which resulted in people living close to those projects to be displaced. I have not been 
able to get specific numbers of people affected by such projects, but arguably, they could 
be in their thousands. Some of the major projects of the 70s included the Tanzania-
Zambia Railway, Tanzania-Zambia Highway, and Tanzania-Zambia Oil Pipeline, all of 
which run through hundreds of villages over the thousands of kilometres between 
Tanzania and Zambia.   
 
Other large infrastructure projects in the 80s and early 90s which displaced some people 
included the Mtera and Kihansi hydroelectric power dams, expansion of the former Dar 
es Salaam International Airport, now Julius Nyerere International Airport; Mindu water 
dam in Morogoro, and establishment of Morogoro and Moshi waste disposal sites. 
 
In each of these development projects, some people were forced to relocate to give way. 
However, I have not come across complaints or strong opinion to indicate that the people 
who were displaced were handled in the same way the people were treated, or reacted, at 
Bulyanhulu. I will return to this apparent ‘non-complaining behaviour’ when I discuss 
reasons for complaints below. Before I do so, I also highlight some experiences with 
displacements that were caused by mining projects. I call this type of displacement 
‘Mining-Induced Displacement’. 
7.3 Mining-Induced Displacement 
As explained elsewhere, Tanzania is teemed with minerals of various quantity and quality 
in different places around the country. Before liberalisation of the mineral sector in the 
late 90s, large-scale mining operations were done by the state-owned companies. Two of 
the large-scale mining projects worth mentioning here are the Mwadui Diamond Mine, 
which was established in the 1920s, and in which the government had at least 50 per cent 
shares, and Kiwira Coal Mine. My research has found little evidence to suggest that there 
had been massive displacements in the course of establishing these projects, or evidence 
suggestive of conflicts between the projects and the people living nearby those mines. 
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 Another example worth mentioning is the Songosongo Natural Gas Project. This is also a 
joint venture involving the Government of Tanzania, the World Bank, and private 
investors. The project was initiated in 1995/96, and after surveys and valuation of land 
and property, the compensation was effected during 1997 to 1998. The financial 
agreement among the partners was signed in 2001, construction started in 2003, and gas 
extraction and transportation started in 2004. The gas pipeline covers about 217 
kilometres from the source at Somanga in Kilwa to Wazo Hill in Dar es Salaam, and its 
construction affected about 3,000 people who were duly compensated with land and 
money at the rate that was considered ‘generous’. Today, this displacement is considered 
by relevant land experts, some of whom I interviewed, as the most successful 
(resettlement) undertaking in the country. 
7.4 Factors explaining the experience of Mining-Induced Displacement at 
Bulyanhulu 
Apart from the Bulyanhulu gold mine project, between 1998 and 2001, at least 120,000 
people have been displaced to pave way for development of four gold mining projects 
alone (see Chapter Four). In all these displacements there have been protests and 
complaints from the project affected people. However, in none of those displacements, 
had there been so much controversy and resistance to the level shown in the Bulyanhulu 
case. Why was that the case? 
 
The following combination of factors could shed light on the experience of mining-
induced displacements in general and for the specific case of Bulyanhulu as compared to 
other development-induced or even mining-induced, displacements in the country. 
7.4.1 Use of excessive force to evict the small-scale miners 
In all other displacements that have occurred in the country, none witnessed the use of 
such excessive force and destruction, for so many people in one area. This violent method 
likely contributed to bitterness and retribution by the evictees. So far the mining 
community has used legal system to seek redress. However, during my interviews (in 
July 2006) with some of the affected people, they are ready to use violent methods to 
counteract the unfair treatment of the mining company. Indeed, in February 2007, the 
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 residents in the area turned violent to avenge perceived further unfair treatment by the 
company. In short, this proves the maxim that violence breeds violence. 
7.4.2 The sheer number of people directly affected by the project negatively 
By any standards, 400,000 people being displaced and having their livelihoods curtailed 
or disturbed in one way or another, is a large number. The recent (from late 1990s to 
2000s) mining-induced displacements (apart from the Bulyanhulu, that is) combined 
affected about 120,000 people in four different places. Even what is considered as the 
well-managed displacement referred above, the Songosongo Natural Gas Project, 
affected only about 3,000 people. Therefore, the sheer number of people involved in the 
Bulyanhulu case made it different compared to what has happened in other related 
displacements. I should add, however, that large number affected the outcome (of the 
situation at Bulyanhulu) both negatively and positively: negatively because of the many 
varied interests within the affected community, possibly delaying consensus within the 
group; and positively because the large number attracted interest, sympathy and support 
from external parties. 
7.4.3 Amount and type or form of compensation  
Although the rate of compensation used to pay the few households that were 
compensated was the government rate, it is widely acknowledged by the public and land 
professionals, that the rate in use was unrealistically low. In 1996 and even in 1998, for 
instance, the rate used for compensation was TZS 47,000 (USD 84) for one hectare of 
rice, TZS 33,000 (USD 59) for maize, TZS 11, 250 (USD 20) for millet, TZS 22,660 
(USD 40) for cassava or TZS 16, 090 (USD 29) per hectare.19 These were, and are, the 
common (food) crops in the area under study. Compensation for houses (buildings) 
depended (and still depends) on parameters such as building materials, function of 
building, location and prevailing market conditions.  
 
                                                 
19 The rates were issued by the Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture on 16 September 1992 and 
were in force until 1999 when the new land acts were enacted. Old rates applied uniformly throughout the 
country, while currently district councils are empowered to set their own rates depending on market forces. 
Exchange rate was about 1USD equivalent to TZS 560. 
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 By comparison, the compensation rate used by the Geita Gold Mine in 2001 was USD 
200 per acre (an area which is smaller than the hectare), a rate higher than that set by the 
government. In the case of Songosongo Natural Gas Project, while the government rate 
was set as mere TZS 6,000 (USD 11) per large tree (for example, a mango, coconut or 
jack fruit tree which are common trees in the area affected), the project developers were 
willing and actually paid TZS 22,000 (USD 39) per tree. This relatively high 
compensation rate encouraged people to willingly take part in the project. Some even saw 
displacement as an opportunity to improve their incomes.  
 
In contrast, the displacees at Bulyanhulu were poorly compensated and naturally 
challenged the compensation level in court. Some of the affected people at Bulyanhulu 
plainly stated that they were ready to leave the area any time provided they were duly and 
fairly compensated. 
7.4.4 The legacy of Ujamaa policies  
The legacy of Tanzanian or African Socialism, Ujamaa, is still much alive among many 
of the Tanzanians, 40 years after the ideology was formally introduced in the country in 
1967, and despite its non-official abandonment in 1991 when the government adopted 
liberal economic policies. There is a common mistrust of foreigners running the pillars of 
the economy, including such sectors as mining. This sense or feeling of mistrust is 
compounded by the fact that the majority of the people are yet to enjoy the benefits of 
privatisation as they had been promised. To make matters worse, most of the investors 
have been accused by some sections of the media, civil society organisations and 
politicians of ‘stealing’ from the country through various means, but especially, lopsided 
contracts and tax evasion. 
 
A disenchanted public typically blames their poverty on privatisation, which to them is 
more of ‘foreignisation’ (Ugenishaji in Kiswahili as opposed to Ubinafsishaji which is 
privatisation).  Such disenchantment produces negative attitudes toward foreign 
investors. The perception that the country has been ‘sold to foreigners’ provides a 
straightforward impetus for discrediting foreign investors, non-cooperation and even 
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 sabotage. Indeed, such acts allow people to vent their frustration and anger as they 
remember the past Ujamaa with nostalgia. 
7.4.5 The legacy of anti-apartheid struggle 
Since the adoption of open market economies, a number of South African companies 
have come to invest in Tanzania. Currently, South African investments in Tanzania 
account for 10 per cent of all foreign investments in the country, South Africa being the 
second largest investor in Tanzania.20 Indeed, most of the foreign capital and investments 
in Tanzania, whose majority shareholders and owners could be in Australia, Europe or 
North America, are held by companies which have a connection of one way or another in 
South Africa. Kahama Mining Corporation is one of such cases. Most of its operations 
are coordinated from South Africa and its foreign staff is mainly recruited from South 
Africa. Most of the company supplies including foodstuffs are imported from South 
Africa. Considered as the most developed country in Africa south of the Sahara, South 
Africa is the centre of capital in sub-Saharan Africa: it is the centre of the periphery. It 
should, therefore, not be surprising that, to a common man at Bulyanhulu and indeed in 
Tanzania as a whole, who always sees this South African face, the mining company is 
more South African than Canadian.  
 
During the struggle for the liberation of South African countries and anti-racism against 
the apartheid South Africa regime, Tanzania was the centre of this movement and there 
was strong political animosity between Tanzania and South Africa. Because of this 
history, even today, some people in Tanzania maintain this sentiment toward White South 
Africans and would call them Makaburu, Kiswahili word for Boers, which is considered 
derogatory, to express their sentiments. Incidentally, some Tanzanians also believe that 
some White South Africans hated and continue to hate Tanzanians because of their stance 
against South Africa, noting that Tanzania was the axis of the liberation struggle. 
 
                                                 
20 Figures attributed to Basil Mramba, Minister for Industry, Trade and Marketing, issued on April 1, 2007, 
before the meeting of presidents of Tanzania and South Africa. Between 1990 and 2006, about 150 
companies from South Africa invested businesses worth USD 467m. 
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 This view, on the impact of historical relations between Tanzania and South Africa was 
shared by a Tanzanian senior official with one of the giant foreign gold mine companies, 
as well as by another government official in the Ministry of Minerals. Indeed, some 
respondents at Bulyanhulu used the term Boers when referring to the mining company. 
 
In a nutshell, the resistance by the mining community at Bulyanhulu cannot be divorced 
from the Tanzanian past political and economic policies and its relations with the 
apartheid South African regime. 
7.4.6 Increased awareness of basic rights among the population 
Compared to the period before 1991, the general public is more aware of their basic 
rights. This can be attributed to several factors including increased government 
transparency; competing political parties which challenge the government; the existence 
and increase of civil society organisations which educate the public on human rights; the 
presence of private media which report news items that might otherwise sometimes be 
ignored or censored by the government media because of its sensitivity, and a more 
educated public in general. 
 
In the past (during Ujamaa era) it would have been unexpected for an individual, leave 
alone a thousand people, to institute legal proceedings against the government interest or 
decision. Today, people are more aware of their individual rights, and because of the 
influence of liberal policies, people have become individualistic and are more likely to 
challenge the communal or public rights when they feel that their own right have been 
trespassed or usurped by another, person, a group or an institution. That is to say, even if 
the state had in the past taken over land from villagers for the other development projects, 
for the public interest, still the people would have accepted this and not claimed any 
compensation. 
 
The above factors created an enabling environment for the mining community at 
Bulyanhulu to stage their resistance and influence the outcome that is present today. 
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 7.4.7 Participation of the project affected people 
In the case of Songosongo project discussed above, there was “sufficient” consultation 
and negotiation among the stakeholders to the extent that the project affected people 
“understood” and “cooperated”.  In the cases of both Geita and Nzega mine projects there 
were some consultations also, and this may explain why in those projects there has not 
been such strong opposition compared to the one in Bulyanhulu. 
 
In the Songosongo project at least one year, from 1997 to 1998, was used to sort out 
compensation issues. In fact, some people did not leave the area until in 2002 because 
they needed “sufficient” time to mobilize their exit from the project area, according to the 
project social development officer. 
 
In the case of Bulyanhulu there was hardly any consultation or negotiation as required by 
the Land Acquisition law and the Environmental Impact Assessment process. The 
government issued a one-month notice demanding the people to vacate the area. In 
addition, the forceful eviction was carried out while the matter was still in court, and 
despite the fact that the mining community had won a court injunction temporarily 
preventing its eviction.  
7.4.8 Implementation of community development and social projects 
After the new investor had taken over the mining site, there were pledges that the 
company would support the surrounding community through social projects such as 
provision of potable water, health and education facilities and roads. According to the 
respondents in the area, almost none of the promises had been fulfilled. In fact, some of 
the respondents were concerned that the main water source for Kakola village, for 
instance, had been taken over by the company denying the thousands of the households 
of the important community common property. 
 
The villagers also complained that the hospital that was run by the mining company 
offered services for charges that were beyond the reach of most common people in the 
villages. As for the road services, the community was of the view that the company was 
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 concerned only with the main roads leading to Kahama and Geita which the company use 
to get its supplies through to or out of the site. 
 
The company, however, has contributed to the construction of at least two primary 
schools and one secondary school, a market structure, and also supported an HIV/AIDS 
project. 
 
In general, communities around most of the mine projects have complained that the 
mining companies did not support the communities in their community development 
projects. However, in the case of Songosongo project, there have been considerable 
investments in community development projects including electrification scheme in the 
areas covered by the gas pipeline. 
 
Such differences in implementation of ‘promised development’ make the difference in 
how one displaced mining community relates and reacts to the mining-induced 
displacement and its proponents and especially foreign investors.  
7.4.9 The conduct of land and property valuation before the compensation 
According to one informant, an expert in land valuation, between 70 and 80 per cent of 
complaints arising from compensation cases in Tanzania are related to assessment. It 
could be because of the methods of assessment (valuation) used, or the rate of 
compensation fixed by the government (as shown previously), or what the claimants 
perceive they should receive as fair compensation. 
 
Respondents at Bulyanhulu claimed that the valuation exercise was rushed and almost 
arbitrary, and was supervised by officials from the mining company. This is contrary to 
procedures. In the standard practice, compensation is approved after the claim forms have 
been endorsed by the following officials: the officer who conducted the valuation, the 
Government Chief Valuer, Ward Executive Officer, Land Officer, District 
Commissioner, and Regional Commissioner. Compensation to the claimant is effected by 
the Cashier in the presence of the Village (or hamlet) Chair and the Valuer.  
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 This procedure was not adhered to and could be one of the causes of complaints from the 
displaced persons. From the experience in Tanzania, valuation and compensation 
exercises have been fraught with corruption and misappropriation of funds by some 
authorities involved in the chain. There were also reports of similar situations in the case 
of Bulyanhulu, and at least the official responsible for compensation from the mining 
company was later fired. According to my informants, the issue of compensation was the 
main cause for his firing. Close by at Geita, there were also reports of misappropriation 
of funds meant for the compensation for people evicted to allow development of the 
Geita Gold Mine. Such corruption and misappropriation have even been discussed in 
parliament. 
 
In contrast, the developers in the Songosongo project used an independent valuer and not 
the government valuer as would normally be the case. This helped building trust in the 
whole process and avoided or minimized unnecessary possible complaints in future from 
the would-be claimants. Recently (March 2007), the Minister for Energy and Minerals, 
who was visiting one of the mining areas in the country, conceded that it was time the 
government reviewed its practice on land valuation and compensation and use 
independent valuers when the government were involved in a land transaction.21 
7.4.10 What the land actually contains and use of the land after the eviction 
Central to the Bulyanhulu eviction and displacement was a contestation over the right to 
own resources, and more importantly, valuable resources in the name and form of gold. It 
can, therefore, be understood when the resistance and feelings to let go of the resources 
are strong, especially so when the process to dispossess one group of those resources and 
give them to another is not as smooth.  
 
Despite what could be described as a successful displacement in the case of Songosongo 
project, compared to the Bulyanhulu project, it is instructive to remember that these two 
projects were different in terms of what their affected lands contained and was actually 
                                                 
21 See an article ‘Government seek solution to conflicts in mines’ (Uhuru, March 22, 2007). My translation 
of title from Kiswahili. See http://www.uhuru.info/Habari%20mchanganyiko.htm 
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 worth in real terms. For Songosongo project the land taken over was the way leave, and 
to our knowledge, that taken land does not contain valuable minerals compared to gold, 
which supported the livelihoods of the affected communities. The pipeline is merely used 
to transport natural gas which is not as valuable and was not even a source of livelihood 
of the affected communities. By contrast, in the case of Bulyanhulu, the local community 
was involved in mining gold, and the new investor was to continue mining gold. In this 
case, it is easy to predict how the affected community would react.  
 
There are other smaller-scale examples in the country, such as evicting miners from sand 
or gravel quarries where the resistance was equally low because the quarries were 
eventually taken by the government and put to other use such as dumpsites or simply land 
filled and converted into residential plots. 
 
The point is that the actual value of the land for those evicted greatly influences the 
outcome of the displacement. The government is slowly accepting this reality after some 
advice from different quarters including from legislators from mining areas. Recently 
(March 2007), the Minister for Energy and Minerals also acknowledged the need to 
broaden the scope of valuation so that people being displaced from mining areas should 
also be compensated for the underground content and not only for their surface 
development of the land. This statement was made while the minister addressed the 
public in one of the mining areas that have experienced conflicts between the investors 
and the local communities.22 
7.5 Drawing Lessons 
Several lessons can be drawn from the discussions in the preceding chapters, and from 
my findings in the field. They are summarized below. 
7.5.1 Policy and Legal Issues and Challenges 
1. The policy and legal framework governing mining in Tanzania is geared towards 
attracting foreign investment. Such emphasis occurs at the expense of the wider 
society and has a potential for a heavy social cost. The sometimes-violent 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
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 reactions from the affected communities attest to this challenge. This reality is 
further evidenced by increased protests and questioning from politicians, 
academicians, civil society organisations and the common man and woman in the 
street over the large-scale mining rights and contracts awarded to foreign mining 
companies. The government has occasionally admitted that the contracts were 
lopsided against its (government) favour, and has promised to renegotiate them so 
that a win-win situation was achieved. 
 
2. It has become clear that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which was, 
and is, mandatory before a large-scale investment such as one of mining is to take 
place, was not sufficient in its scope. More disturbing, however, is the fact that the 
impact assessment was conducted after the community had been evicted! In 
essence, the main thrust of the assessment was on the physical environment and 
with little regard for the social and economic conditions of the people to be 
affected by the development. With the passing of the new National Environment 
Management Act of 2004, the assessment has to include the social impact. 
Effectively, the term has become Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(ESIA).  
 
3.    Tanzania does not have an official policy on resettlement. Matters relating to 
displacement and compensation are dealt with using the Land Acquisition Act of 
1967, Land Act No 4 of 1999, Village Land Act No 5 of 1999, and the 
Compensation Procedures and Practices of the Commission of Lands in Tanzania. 
The government has applied the World Bank guidelines on Involuntary 
Resettlement as was the case in the Songosongo Natural Gas Project when it used 
Operational Directive OD 430. The current guideline formulated and advocated 
by the World Bank is known as Operational Policy OP 4.12. Through the support 
of the World Bank Mission in Tanzania, efforts have been initiated to draft the 
National Resettlement Policy.  
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 4.      At the moment at least two ministries are involved on issues relating to land on 
which mining has to take place, namely the Ministry for Energy and Minerals 
(MEM) and the Ministry for Lands, Housing and Human Settlements 
Development (MLHHSD). The former grants mining rights while the latter grants 
surface rights. Other government institutions which may be involved include the 
Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government, currently under the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Regional and District authorities including the 
District Councils also maintain interests because, in practice, the lands under the 
villages fall within their jurisdictions. At the same time, there is a government 
institution, called Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), which promotes and 
facilitates investments within the country. Experience has shown that in the 
course of implementing their mandates all these stakeholders have sometimes 
contributed to the confusion regarding land and mining rights. Recently (March 
2007), the minister responsible for minerals admitted  this challenge and advised 
that it would be worthwhile for mining investors to visit the areas they wanted to 
conduct their operations in, meet local authorities and even the local communities 
owning or using the land to minimise the potential of conflicts over the land in 
question.23 According to law, mining rights override all other rights in an area. 
7.5.2 Global politics and gold politics 
As argued previously, gold production is a global business affecting and affected by 
political interests and considerations both internationally and locally. In the case of 
Bulyanhulu it is apparent there was a role of international politics whereby some leaders 
from some nations influenced, coerced or convinced a government to act in the way it 
did. This might explain why the government of Tanzania (state) disobeyed its own 
institutions violating laws, rules and procedures. In this case the political and economic 
interests of the few clearly overrode rationale and interests of the nation.  
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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7.5.3 Development and Environmental Narratives 
When the small-scale miners were being evicted, one of the justifications given by the 
government was that large-scale miners would bring in more money for the country, and 
that small-scale miners were destroying the environment. However, his view is not shared 
by all parties. In Mining and Environmental Issues Under Structural Adjustment 
Programmes in Tanzania, Bagachwa and Limbu (eds.) (1995) write: 
‘Most experts are content with the view that small miners are environmentally 
destructive, and they seem to suggest that the only way out of this situation is to 
substitute them with larger ones. This view is based on the political considerations 
underpinning particular economic interests rather than on an actual understanding of the 
processes taking place on the ground. It is true that small-scale mining endangers the 
environment, health etc. But in some instances, as is demonstrated in the case of 
Mahenge, under the present arrangements large scale mining is even more damaging’ 
(emphasis supplied) (p. 252). 
 
In his speech to the Deputy Minister for Energy and Minerals when he visited Geita 
District on January 20th, 2006, the District Mining Officer reported that between January 
and December 2005 Geita Gold Mine (GGM) mined 22,340.299 kg of gold earning TZS 
300,381,232,262.00 (USD 254,629,418.37), while small-scale miners mined 54.772 kg of 
gold earning TZS 389,328.438, 30.24 A simple calculation shows that small-scale miners 
earned approximately TZS 7.1m per kg, while the large-scale miner earned TZS 13.4m 
per kg. On average, the company produced about 1,861.691 kg of gold per month, while 
the small-scale miners managed only 4.564 kg per month. However, if one compares the 
money earned by the two groups in relation to their volumes of production, one can 
appreciate the role of the small-scale miners on the national economy. 
 
According to the Small-scale Miners Committee at Bulyanhulu, between October 1992 
and January 1995, which is before the eviction, the small-scale miners were able to 
produce an average of 351 kg of gold per month on average which was sold to the local 
banks.  
                                                 
24 Taarifa Fupi ya Wilaya ya Geita kwa Naibu Waziri wa Nishati na Madini, Mhe. Lawrence K. Masha 
(MB), Tarehe 20/01/2006 
112 
  
Before liberalization of the mineral sector, about 80 per cent of mineral export came from 
gold mined by artisanal miners and the sector contributed 15 per cent of GDP, whereas 
after liberalization and heavy industrialization, the contribution of the sector is less than 4 
per cent (Dreschler, 2001; Bagachwa and Limbu, 1995; MEM, 1997; Tanzania Economic 
Survey, 2004; 2005). 
 
A study by Christian Aid on taxation in mining presented at the 2007 World Economic 
Forum (WEF) at Davos, Switzerland, revealed that despite the global commodity boom 
over the past three years, African governments are missing out in increasing tax and 
royalties, and in some cases actually receiving less revenue from mining companies than 
before.25 The report showed that although production of copper, gold, nickel and 
platinum soared, the Tanzanian government's revenue from gold fell by nearly a third 
once the rise in prices has been factored in. Zambia saw revenues from copper halve. 
Christian Aid blamed the International Monetary Fund which pressurised governments 
such as that of Tanzania to liberalize the mineral sector on advantageous terms to 
multinational mining firms. 
7.5.4 Winners and losers 
At this juncture, it is worth pausing and asking who have been the winners and losers in 
this displacement in a globalising environment. It is a truism that globalisation opened 
Bulyanhulu and its mineral resources to the world. However, as soon as the doors were 
opened these resources became ‘more accessible for those who have the economic, 
political, technological and cultural power to control their extraction, distribution and use, 
while the individual or community may experience increased insecurity over resource 
control’ (Granfelt, 1999, p.2). 
 
The above quotation captures what befell the mining community of Bulyanhulu. No 
doubt they are the losers in this game, while the large-scale investors have become 
                                                 
25 Western bankers and lawyers 'rob Africa of $150bn every year': Africa kept destitute as western firms 
shift cash to tax havens. By Nick Mathiason in Nairobi. The Observer. Sunday January 21, 2007.  
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 winners. And as Paehlke (2003, p.13 put it, ‘In today’s globalised economy the “winner-
takes-all phenomenon” has become pervasive.’ In fact, at least two respondents at 
Bulyanhulu said they feel that they have become victims of mining investments in 
Tanzania, charging that for an area to have minerals discovered it is more of a curse than 
a blessing. 
7.5.5 Whose development counts? 
It is also possible to interpret the events of Bulyanhulu on the argument that the decisions 
were taken by bureaucrats and/or politicians who defined development in the terms and 
understanding that were different from those of the mining community. The executive 
arm of the government thought that by replacing small-scale miners with large-scale 
investors, the government would get more revenues which could be used to finance 
national development. But it is obvious now that this exchange as it were, has made the 
individuals in the mining community less developed, or simply poorer. It was, therefore, 
the question of national development versus private and/or community development.  The 
question that begs is Whose development counts? 
 
McDowell (1996) quotes a 1975 publication by Adam Curle, who asked, ‘How much 
suffering for how many can be justified by how much good for how many?’ (p. 95). 
 
The quick answer to this question would be based on the idea of ‘public interest’, which 
includes ‘investments of national interest’.  However, according to Professor Issa 
Shivji26, ‘public interest is a vague and wide term opening to abuse.’  
 
 
As a conclusion to this chapter, the study has been able to identify a number of issues in 
relation to development-induced displacement, and in particular to what could be referred 
to as mining-induced displacement that is increasingly taking place in Tanzania. It is 
noteworthy that the government has acknowledged some of the challenges and has started 
taking some steps towards addressing those issues and challenges. Top government 
                                                 
26 Prof Issa Shivji is a retired law professor from Tanzania, and an authority on constitutional and land law. 
See his paper presented to the Parliamentary Committee for Finance and Economic Affairs Workshop on 
the Bills for the Land Act and the Village Land Act, Dodoma, 26th – 28th January, 1999. 
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 leaders have been urging the mining companies to collaborate with the local communities 
in which they are operating, and the government is in the process of reviewing and 
renegotiating contracts with some of the large-scale mining companies. 
 
The government, with the support from the World Bank has also started the process of 
formulating the National Resettlement Policy. Recognising the role played by artisanal 
miners, a programme is being designed which will try to identify, organise and assist 
small-scale miners throughout the country. The five-year programme is known as 
Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources in Tanzania. 
 
 
To conclude this chapter, I tend to agree with McDowell (Ibid. p.96) who says, ‘When 
local communities resist the state’s efforts to resettle them to make way for development 
projects, they call into question not only reigning models of development and resource 
exploitation, but also the state’s right to define local terrain and priorities.’ And in my 
view, they also challenge the notion of public interest. 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I set out to explore the livelihoods of a local community displaced by an 
international, large-scale mining project. In the preceding chapters, I have provided the 
background to the eviction and displacement; described the current livelihoods of the 
displaced; outlined the role and influence of different stakeholders on the outcome of the 
displacement, and drew out some key lessons from the displacement. This chapter is 
devoted to drawing conclusions and recommendations for future actions. It ends with a 
suggestion for further studies. 
8.2 Conclusions 
On the issue of livelihoods of the displaced persons, the study has found that the 
displacees were of the opinion that they were poorer now than they were before the 
displacement, both in terms of income and non-income indicators. In short, displacement 
has contributed to their impoverishment. In this study, the impoverishment was expressed 
in terms of less land available to the population, decreased gainful employment 
opportunities, lower quality of shelter, increased food insecurity, lack of access to 
common property and disruption of social networks following community dispersal. As 
mentioned before the eviction, the average income among the community was six times 
higher than the neighbouring non-mining communities. This finding seems to support 
evidence from other studies elsewhere which showed that displacement tended to result 
in impoverishment or deterioration of quality of life among the displaced. 
 
On the issue of stakeholders, the study identified the major actors in the displacement as 
the government, the mining community, and the large-scale mining investor. However, 
there were other actors who, although may not appear as visible as these three, 
influentially participated, through action or inaction, in the process and outcome. These 
include the World Bank Group, donor community, local politicians, civil society, and the 
media. 
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 The different roles played by these actors also reflect the power relations, and 
contestations and struggles over meanings and resources among the actors. 
 
There are a number of lessons that could be drawn from this thesis as far as development-
induced displacement at Bulyanhulu is concerned. One of them is that some communities 
can challenge the view that is becoming prevalent in Tanzania, of looking to the 
government, donors and foreign investors as the providers of community development. 
The displaced people were categorical that, providing they owned resources such as land 
and markets for their produce were available, they would spearhead and achieve their 
own development, rather than waiting for the government or investors as they had 
constantly been encouraged into believing. 
 
Another lesson is that, people, in general, subscribe to the view that land belongs to the 
state. However, it is difficult for them to let go of the land unless they are fairly 
compensated. All of the displaced charged that the centre of contention was 
compensation. As I have shown from copies of various media articles, most of the 
conflicts between mining communities and large-scale investors are centred on the 
question of compensation. The example from the Songosongo Natural Gas Project, in 
which people felt that they were fairly compensated, attests to this proposition. 
 
For its part, the government seems to be more aware now of the fact the current laws, 
policies, procedures and or practices governing large-scale mining have contributed a 
great deal to the land conflicts with, and complaints from, local communities around the 
mining areas. Increasing complaints from the general public, but especially from 
members of parliament and politicians from opposition parties, human rights activists and 
the media, have apparently helped in influencing this recognition.  
 
Although it can be considered as an isolated case, the use of violent means by the 
members of the community at Bulyanhulu in February this year, against the property of 
the mining company, sent a strong signal to the government that it has to act quickly to 
remedy the situation before it gets out of hand. At the time of writing, the government 
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 and Kahama Mining Corporation had agreed that Kakola village, which was within the 
mining lease, should be ‘taken off’ the land owned by the company. 
 
Using Political Ecology as the guiding theory, I have been able to argue that the events 
that happened ten years ago at a rural community in Tanzania are part and parcel of the 
globalisation process, one which is dominated by movement of capital from the 
developed world to the developing world, but flow of profits from the latter to the former.  
 
The resistance by the mining community and the current situation where the displaced 
community questions the promised development bring into focus the question of whose 
development should matter to warrant what may appear as curtailing of another’s 
development. Is this a question of national development versus individual and community 
development? 
 
I consider this study as a contribution in the area of development studies, where, often 
times, there are no simple answers to complex questions, and sometimes, there are neither 
right nor wrong answers. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
In my view, the government has acknowledged the weaknesses present in various 
legislation and policies with regard to mining development in the country. What needs to 
be done is to review those instruments, sooner rather than later, with a view to 
formulating them to fit with the present-day realities.  
 
One major area that needs to be addressed is the criteria and rate of compensation to the 
displaced persons in mining areas. The current criteria for compensation are based on 
surface land development, and normally this implies farm or building development. But 
with small-scale miners, land development could be done underground. It is hoped that 
calls to give value to what is contained underground, and not only on the surface, would 
be heeded. 
 
119 
 Investors working in mining communities need to develop good relationship with those 
communities around them to avoid negative perception. Although Kahama Mining 
Corporation has contributed to some social development projects in the area (and 
beyond), it appears that there is room for improving this collaboration for the mutual 
benefit of both the company and the community. 
8.4 Suggestions for further studies 
Tanzania is teeming with minerals most of which are yet to be explored and exploited, 
and it is likely more deposits will be discovered in the foreseeable future. At present, 
there are a number of exploration and exploitation taking place. At the same time, some 
mining companies are holding vast lands deemed to have potential for exploration and 
subsequently mining. Considering the fact that in most cases people living around the 
mining areas would have to be resettled to allow for the large-scale mining to take place, 
it would seem that there will be more mining-induced displacement in Tanzania in the 
foreseeable future. I would therefore suggest in-depth studies on how best to deal with or 
prevent conflicts between large-scale mining investors and small-scale miners and their 
local communities. Such studies should preferably come up with concrete suggestions on 
achieving peaceful co-existence between large-scale investors and small-mining 
communities. The studies should provide actionable recommendations on how to achieve 
a win-win solution. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interview Guide for Affected Members of Community 
1. Confirm presence of respondent during eviction 
 
2. Get their background 
 
3. Ask for description of the eviction process 
 
4. Focus on elements of livelihood owned or enjoyed before the eviction (land, home 
(house), job, food security, common property, social networks) and quality of life 
then 
 
5. Focus on elements of livelihood owned or enjoyed after the eviction (land, home 
(house), job, food security, common property, social networks) and quality of life 
now 
 
6. Ask about their major concern currently 
 
Appendix 2: Key Issues for Focus Group Discussion 
1. What is their major concern after the displacement? 
 
2. What is their view of development? 
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Appendix 3: Police reports on incidences of land conflicts in some districts 1996-2006 
Police 
District 
Period Parties involved 
 
Cause of 
conflict 
 
Severity 
(and frequency) 
1998 Villagers from two 
bordering districts 
(Kiteto and Kilindi) 
Village 
boundary 
 1 death 
1999 Farmers and herders 
from two bordering 
districts  
(Kiteto and Kondoa) 
Boundary 
between 
farmland and 
pastureland 
1 death, 
1 police injured 
by bullet 
1999 Farmers and herders 
from two bordering 
villages 
Boundary 
between 
farmland and 
pastureland 
7 deaths 
Manyara 
2002 Farmers and herders 
from two bordering 
districts  
(Kiteto and Kondoa) 
Boundary 
between 
farmland and 
pastureland 
1 death 
2002 Large investor 
(commercial farmer) 
and villagers 
Land 
ownership 
dispute 
3 deaths, 
4 injured 
2006 Large investor 
(commercial farmer) 
and villagers 
Land 
ownership 
dispute 
No incident yet 
(case still being 
addressed by  
District 
Commissioner and 
Ministry of Lands) 
Babati 
2006 Tarangire National 
Park and villagers 
Land 
ownership 
dispute 
No incident yet 
(case still being 
addressed by 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Prime Minister’s 
Office) 
1998 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Dispute over 
tanzanite 
mining rights 
11 incidences; 
several injured 
and property 
destroyed 
Simanjiro 
1999 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
6 incidences; 
several injured 
and property 
destroyed 
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 the investor 
2000 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
41 incidences; 
several injured 
and property 
destroyed 
2001 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
12 incidences; 
2 deaths, several 
injured and 
property 
destroyed 
2002 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
6 incidences; 
several injured 
and property 
destroyed 
2003 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
28 incidences; 
4 injured and 
property 
destroyed 
2004 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
20 incidences; 
 property 
destroyed 
2005 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
14 incidences; 
property 
destroyed 
2006 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
13 incidences; 
property 
destroyed 
Nzega 2006 
(October-
November) 
Small-scale miners (at 
Mwanzwilo village) 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Dispute over 
mining rights 
No incident; 
(small-scale miners 
evicted peacefully 
by government) 
Igunga 2006 Small-scale miners (at 
Ntobo village) and 
Mining exploration 
company 
Small-scale 
miners 
invading the 
mining area of 
the investor 
No incident; 
(small-scale miners 
evicted peacefully 
and exploration 
continuing)  
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 Korogwe 1996-2006 Small-scale miners 
and Large scale-
miners (foreign 
investor) 
Dispute over 
mining rights 
1 death 
Singida 
Rural 
2006 Villagers (at 
Mang’onyi) and 
foreign mining 
company 
Dispute over 
compensation 
for land taken 
by investor for 
exploration 
No incident; 
(aggrieved villagers 
have sued the 
investor, village 
government and the 
district council)  
Different clans (tribal 
clashes) 
Land dispute 16 deaths, 
9 injured 
Small-scale miners 
and large-scale miners 
(foreign investor) 
Dispute over 
mining rights 
3 injured 
Tarime 1996-2006 
Villagers and large-
scale investor 
Dispute over 
mining rights 
3 deaths 
Musoma 
Rural 
 Small-scale miners 
and large-scale miners 
(foreign investor) 
Dispute over 
mining rights 
4 injured 
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 Appendix 4: Newspaper articles 
Guardian, July 19, 2001. Mining activities: what is wrong? (editorial) 
 
Guardian, July 27, 2001. Tarime villagers invade gold mine. 
 
Daily News, July 31st 1996. Government orders out Bulyanhulu miners 
 
Daily News, March 9, 2007. VP cautions on disputes 
 
Majira, August 12, 1996.  Kufuatia amri ya kuwatimua wachimbaji wadogo: Watu 23 
wahofiwa kufunikwa na 'greda' Bulyanhulu (Following the order to evict 
artisanal miners: 23 feared buried alive by bulldozers at Bulyanhulu) 
Majira, August 30, 1996. Aliyenusurika kufukiwa Bulyanhulu ataja waliokufa: Adai 
wenzake wanne wamekufa  (A survivor names the dead: Claims four colleagues 
are dead) 
Majira, September 17, 1996. Hakuna waliofukiwa mashimoni Bulyanhulu – Kiwelu 
(Nobody buried in the mine pits - Kiwelu”. 
 
Guardian, September 9 1996, The published a feature article "The day hell broke loose at 
Bulyanhulu" 
 
Tanzania Daima, January 15, 2007. Mgodi wa Geita waamriwa kulipa fidia (Geita Gold 
Mine ordered to effect compensation) 
 
This Day, April 13, 2007. Villagers give diamond giant  run for their money 
 
Guardian, December 30, 2006. Govt allows TanzanineOne to use live bullets on 
intruders 
Guardian, August 1, 2001. Small miners say ‘no’ to government order 
 
Guardian, October 27, 2001. Sword of Damocles hangs over Mwabomba small miners 
 
Nipashe, August 1, 2001. Kahama gold miners resist removal 
 
Mtanzania, August 13, 1996. Utata Watawala Maafa ya Kahama: Waliokufa 
machimboni wahofiwa kufikia 52: Picha za maiti zapelekwa Dodoma, wadaiwa 
kufunikwa na magreda (Controversy reigns over Kahama mine tragedy: Death 
toll feared to reach 52. Photos of the victims sent to Dodoma. Victims allegedly 
buried by bulldozers). 
 
Uhuru, March 22, 2007. Serikali yatafuta dawa  
ya migogoro machimboni (Government seek solution to conflicts in mines) 
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 Business Times, June 23 - 29, 2006 
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 The East African, June 26 - July 2, 2006 
 
 
 
131 
 Daily News, July 10, 2006 
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 Daily News, July 11, 2006 
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 The Guardian, July 19, 2006 
 
 
The African, July 28, 2006 
 
 
Sunday Citizen, July 30, 2006  
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 Daily News, July 19, 2006 
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